


Software Analyzers

EVA - The Evolved Value Analysis plug-in





The EVA plug-in

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FAQ

Chapter 1 Introduction

Frama-C is a modular static analysis framework for the C language. This manual documents the EVA (for Evolved Value Analysis) plug-in of Frama-C.

The EVA plug-in automatically computes sets of possible values for the variables of an analyzed program. EVA warns about possible run-time errors in the analyzed program. Lastly, synthetic information about each analyzed function can be computed automatically from the values provided by EVA: these functionalities (input variables, output variables, and information flow) are also documented here.

The framework, the EVA plug-in and the other plug-ins documented here are all Open Source software. They can be downloaded from http://frama-c.com/.

In technical terms, EVA is context-sensitive and path-sensitive. In non-technical terms, this means that it tries to offer precise results for a large set of C programs. Heterogeneous pointer casts, function pointers, and floating-point computations are handled.

1.1 First contact

Frama-C comes with two interfaces: batch and interactive. The interactive graphical interface of Frama-C displays a normalized version of the analyzed source code. In this interface, the EVA plug-in allows the user to select an expression in the code and observe an overapproximation of the set of values this expression can take at run-time.

Here is a simple C example:

introduction.c

int y, z=1;
int f(int x) {

```
3 y = x + 1;
4 return y;
5 }
6 
7 void main(void) {
8 for (y=0; y<2+2; y++)
9 z=f(y);
10 }
```

If either interface of Frama-C is launched with options -val introduction.c, the EVA plug-in is able to guarantee that at each passage through the return statement of function f, the global variables y and z each contain either 1 or 3. At the end of function main, it indicates that y necessarily contains 4, and the value of z is again 1 or 3.

When the plug-in indicates the value of y is 1 or 3 at the end of function f, it implicitly computes the union of all the values in y at each passage through this program point throughout any execution. In an actual execution of this deterministic program, there is only one passage though the end of function main, and therefore only one value for z at this point. The answer given by EVA is approximated but correct (the actual value, 3, is among the proposed values).

The theoretical framework on which EVA is founded is called Abstract Interpretation and has been the subject of extensive research during the last forty years.

1.2 Run-time errors and the absence thereof

An analyzed application may contain run-time errors: divisions by zero, invalid pointer accesses,...

```
rte.c
```

```
int i,t[10];
void main(void) {
for (i=0; i<=8+2; i++)
t[i]=i;
}</pre>
```

When launched with frama-c -val rte.c, EVA emits a warning about an out-of-bound access at line 5:

rte.c:5:[kernel] warning: accessing out of bounds index. assert i < 10;

There is in fact an out-of-bounds access at this line in the program. It can also happen that, because of approximations during its computations, Frama-C emits warnings for constructs that do not cause any run-time errors. These are called "false alarms". On the other hand, the fact that EVA computes correct, over-approximated sets of possible values prevents it from remaining silent on a program that contains a run-time error. For instance, a particular division in the analyzed program is the object of a warning as soon as the set of possible values for the divisor contains zero. Only if the set of possible values computed by EVA does not contain zero is the warning omitted, and that means that the divisor really cannot be null at run-time.

1.3 From Value Analysis to EVA

The EVA plug-in was previously called the *Value Analysis plug-in*. Following major changes in its expressivity and overall precision, the plugin was subsequently renamed to *Evolved Value Analysis*, or EVA for short. Those changes were first made available with the Aluminium version of Frama-C. They are presented in section 5.5.

1.4 Other analyses based on EVA

Frama-C also provides synthetic information on the behavior of analyzed functions: inputs, outputs, and dependencies. This information is computed from the results of the EVA plug-in, and therefore some familiarity with EVA is necessary to get the most of these computations.



Chapter 2 Tutorial

Some use cases for EVA...

2.1 Introduction

Throughout this tutorial, we will see on a single example how to use EVA for the following tasks :

- 1. to get familiar with foreign code,
- 2. to produce documentation automatically,
- 3. to search for bugs,
- 4. to guarantee the absence of bugs.

It is useful to stick to a single example in this tutorial, and there is a natural progression to the list of results above, but in real life, a single person would generally focus on only one or two of these four tasks for a given codebase. For instance, if you need Frama-C's help to reverse engineer the code as in tasks 1 and 2, you have probably not been provided with the quantity of documentation and specifications that is appropriate for meaningfully carrying out task 4.

Frama-C helps you to achieve tasks 1-3 in less time than you would need to get the same results using the traditional approach of writing tests cases. Task 4, formally guaranteeing the absence of bugs, can in the strictest sense not be achieved at all using tests for two reasons. Firstly, many forms of bugs that occur in a C program (including buffer overflows) may cause the behavior of the program to be non-deterministic. As a consequence, even when a test suite comes across a bug, the faulty program may appear to work correctly during tests and

fail later, after it has been deployed. Secondly, the notion of coverage of a test suite in itself is an invention made necessary because tests aren't usually exhaustive. Assume a function's only inputs are two 32-bit integers, each allowed to take the full range of their possible values. Further assume that this function only takes a billionth of a second to run (a couple of cycles on a 2GHz processor). A pencil and the back of an envelope show that this function would take 600 years to test exhaustively. Testing coverage criteria can help decide a test suite is "good enough", but there is an implicit assumption in this reasoning. The assumption is that a test suite that satisfies the coverage criteria finds all the bugs that need to be found, and this assumption is justified empirically only.

2.2 Target code: Skein-256

A single piece of code, the reference implementation for the Skein hash function, is used as an example throughout this document. As of this writing, this implementation is available at http://www.schneier.com/code/skein.zip. The Skein function is Niels Ferguson, Stefan Lucks, Bruce Schneier, Doug Whiting, Mihir Bellare, Tadayoshi Kohno, Jon Callas, and Jesse Walker's entry in the NIST cryptographic hash algorithm competition for SHA-3.

Cryptographic hash functions are one of the basic building blocks from which cryptographic protocols are designed. Many cryptographic protocols are designed with the assumption that an implementation for a function h from strings to fixed-width integers is available with the following two properties:

- it is difficult to find two distinct, arbitrary strings s_1 and s_2 such that $h(s_1) = h(s_2)$,
- for a given integer *i*, it is difficult to build a string *s* such that h(s) = i.

A function with the above two properties is called a cryptographic hash function. It is of the utmost importance that the function actually chosen in the implementation of a cryptographic application satisfies the above properties! Any weakness in the hash function can be exploited to corrupt the application.

Proofs of security for cryptographic hash functions are complicated mathematical affairs. These proofs are made using a mathematical definition of the function. Using static analysis for verifying that a piece of code corresponds to the mathematical model which was the object of the security proofs is an interesting topic but is outside the scope of this tutorial. In this document, we will not be using EVA for verifying cryptographic properties.

We will, however, use EVA to familiarize ourselves with Skein's reference implementation, and we will see that it can be a more useful tool than, say, a C compiler, to this effect. We will also use EVA to look for bugs in the implementation of Skein, and finally prove that the functions that implement Skein may never cause a run-time error for a general use pattern. Because of the numerous pitfalls of the C programming language, any amount of work at the mathematical level cannot exclude the possibility of problems such as buffer overflows in the implementation. It is a good thing to be able to rule these out with EVA.

EVA is most useful for embedded or embedded-like code. Although the Skein library does not exactly fall in this category, it does not demand dynamic allocation and uses few functions from external libraries, so it is well suited to this analysis.

2.3 Using EVA for getting familiar with Skein

2.3.1 Writing a test

After extracting the archive skein_NIST_CD_010509.zip, listing the files in NIST/CD/Reference_Implementation shows:

```
      1
      -rw-r--r-- 1 pascal 501
      4984 Oct 14 00:52 SHA3api_ref.c

      2
      -rw-r--r-- 1 pascal 501
      2001 Oct 14 00:54 SHA3api_ref.h

      3
      -rw-r--r-- 1 pascal 501
      6141 Sep 30 00:28 brg_endian.h

      4
      -rw-r--r-- 1 pascal 501
      6921 May 17 2008 brg_types.h

      5
      -rw-r--r-- 1 pascal 501
      34990 Jan 6 01:39 skein.c

      6
      -rw-r--r-- 1 pascal 501
      16290 Nov 9 05:48 skein.h

      7
      -rw-r--r-- 1 pascal 501
      18548 Oct 7 20:02 skein_block.c

      8
      -rw-r--r-- 1 pascal 501
      2646 Oct 9 23:44 skein_debug.c

      9
      -rw-r--r-- 1 pascal 501
      1688 Jul 3 2008 skein_port.h
```

The most natural place to go next is the file skein.h, since its name hints that this is the header with the function declarations that should be called from outside the library. Scanning the file quickly, we may notice declarations such as

The impression we get at first glance is that the hash of an 80-char message containing the string "People of Earth, your attention, please" can be computed as simply as declaring a variable of type Skein_256_Ctxt_t, letting Skein_256_Init initialize it, passing Skein_256_Update a representation of the string, and calling Skein_256_Final with the address of a buffer where to write the hash value. Let us write a C program that does just that:

```
main_1.c
```

```
#include "skein.h"
1
2
   #define HASHLEN (8)
3
4
   int printf(const char*,...);
5
6
   u08b_t msg[80]="People of Earth, your attention, please";
\overline{7}
8
9
   int main(void)
   {
10
     u08b_t hash[HASHLEN];
11
      int i;
12
     Skein_256_Ctxt_t skein_context;
13
```

```
14 Skein_256_Init( &skein_context, HASHLEN);
15 Skein_256_Update( &skein_context, msg, 80);
16 Skein_256_Final( &skein_context, hash);
17 for (i=0; i<HASHLEN; i++)
18 printf("%d\n", hash[i]);
19 return 0;
20 }
```

In order to make the test useful, we have to print the obtained hash value. Because the result we are interested in is an 8-byte number, represented as a char array of arbitrary characters (some of them non-printable), we cannot use string-printing functions, hence the for loop at lines 17-18.

With luck, the compilation goes smoothly and we obtain the hash value:

2.3.2 First try at an analysis using EVA

Let us now see how EVA works on the same example. EVA can be launched with the following command. The analysis should not take more than a few seconds:

frama-c -val *.c >log

Frama-C has its own model of the target platform (the default target is a little-endian 32-bit platform). It also uses the host system's preprocessor. If you want to do the analysis for a different platform than the host platform, you need to provide Frama-C with a way to pre-process the files as they would be during an actual compilation.

There are analyses where the influence of host platform parameters is not noticeable. The analysis we are embarking on is not one of them. If you pre-process the Skein source code with a 64-bit compiler and then analyze it with Frama-C targeting its default 32-bit platform, the analysis will be meaningless and you won't be able to make sense of this tutorial. If you are using a 64-bit compiler, simply match Frama-C's target platform with your host header files by systematically adding the option <code>-machdep x86_64</code> to all commands in this tutorial.

The ">log" part of the command sends all the messages emitted by Frama-C into a file named "log". EVA is verbose for a number of reasons that will become clearer later in this tutorial. The best way to make sense of the information produced by the analysis is to send it to a log file.

There is also a Graphical User Interface for creating analysis projects and visualizing the results. The GUI is still evolving quickly at this stage and it would not make much sense to describe its manipulation in detail in this document. You are however encouraged to try it if it is available on your platform. One way to create an analysis project in the GUI is to pass

the command frama-c-gui the same options that would be passed to frama-c. In this first example, the command frama-c-gui -val *.c launches the same analysis and then opens the GUI for inspection of the results.

The initial syntactic analysis and symbolic link phases of Frama-C may find issues such as inconsistent types for the same symbol in different files. Because of the way separate compilation is implemented, the issues are not detected by standard C compilers. It is a good idea to check for these issues in the first lines of the log.

2.3.3 Missing functions

Since we are trying out the library for the first time, something else to look for in the log file is the list of functions for which the source code is missing. EVA requires either a body or a specification for each function it analyses.

grep "Neither code nor specification" log

This should match lines indicating functions that are both undefined (without source) and that have no specification in Frama-C's standard library. In this example, no functions will be output, since Frama-C's standard library already has prototypes for the most important library functions.

But suppose you would have a custom printing function, say print instead of printf, or some other function with missing source code. For instance, change the code in main_1.c, replacing printf with print, re-run EVA, and then grep the log again. You will obtain this output:

main_1.c:14:[kernel] warning: Neither code nor specification for function print, generating default assigns from the prototype

The warning indicates that EVA is trying to infer an *assigns* clause for the function. This will be explained in detail later (7.2), but for now the important part is that EVA needs either source code or an ACSL specification in order to work. Without those, it can only guess what each function does from the function's prototype, which is both inaccurate and likely incorrect.

Once we are convinced that all functions have either a body or a specification, we can focus on functions without bodies:

grep "using specification for function" log [value] using specification for function memset [value] using specification for function memcpy [value] using specification for function printf

We find three functions. Not having a body for printf is fine, since calls to this function have no observable effects for the analysis. Things are not so clear-cut for memcpy and memset, for which we will provide bodies later.

It is also possible to obtain a list of missing function definitions by using the command:

frama-c -metrics -metrics-libc *.c

This command computes, among other pieces of information, a list of missing functions using a syntactic analysis. It is not exactly equivalent to grepping the log of EVA because it lists all the functions that are missing, while the log of EVA only cites the functions that would have been necessary to an analysis. When analyzing a small part of a large codebase, the latter list may be much shorter than the former. In this case, relying on the information displayed by -metrics means spending time hunting for functions that are not actually necessary.

The output of frama-c -metrics -metrics-libc *.c will then include the following lines:

All functions included from string.h are undefined, but only memcpy, memset and printf are called.

To handle the absence of functions memset and memcpy, we will provide source code for them. Sometimes it is a good idea to provide the exact source code that will actually be used in an actual running environment, so as to detect subtle bugs in the interactions between the program and the system libraries. On the other hand, string manipulation functions often feature difficult-to-analyze architecture-dependent optimizations. For these, it is better to provide a simpler but equivalent implementation. In this particular case, let us provide these two functions in a file that we will place with the others and name "lib.c".

```
#include <string.h>
2
   void * memcpy(void * region1, const void * region2, size_t n)
3
   {
4
     char *dest = (char*)region1;
5
     const char* first = (const char*)region2;
6
     const char* last = ((const char*)region2) + n;
7
     char* result = (char*)region1;
8
     while (first != last)
9
       *dest++ = *first++;
10
      return result;
11
   }
12
13
   void * memset (void * dest, int val, size_t len)
14
15
   Ł
     unsigned char *ptr = (unsigned char*)dest;
16
17
     while (len-- > 0)
       *ptr++ = val;
18
      return dest;
19
   }
20
```

For some functions – including those two – an implementation is already provided in Frama-C. It can be found in the .c files of the directory share/frama-c/libc, usually within a file identically named to the header declaring the functions. For memcpy and memset, the implementation can thus be found in string.c, and adding it to the list of files to be analyzed would make the warning disappear. However, we are going to assume that such implementations are not available in the remainder of this tutorial. Since quite a few functions do not have any implementation in Frama-C's libc, this allows us to show how to deal with the general case.

2.3.4 First meaningful analysis

If we run the analysis again with definitions for memset and memcpy, the newly obtained log no longer mentions any missing function other than printf¹.

The log next contains a description of the initial values of variables. Apart from the variables that we defined ourselves, there is a rather strange one, named ONE and indeed containing 1. Searching the source code reveals that this variable is in fact declared static as it should be. Frama-C can display the value of static variables (something that is annoying to do when using a C compiler for testing). Frama-C may rename static variables in order to distinguish them from another variable with the same name. The GUI displays the original source code alongside the transformed one.

A quick inspection shows that the Skein functions use variable ONE to detect endianness. Frama-C assumes a little-endian architecture by default, so EVA is only analyzing the little-endian version of the library (Frama-C also assumes an IA-32 architecture, so we are only analyzing the library as compiled and run on this architecture). The big-endian version of the library could be analyzed by reproducing the same steps we are taking here for a big-endian configuration of Frama-C.

You will also see lots of variable names prefixed by __fc_, __FC_ and S___fc_. These are all variables coming from ACSL specifications in the Frama-C standard library.

The next line in the log is a progression message, that indicates that EVA has encountered a loop and is performing an approximations. Those messages can be ignored for now.

lib.c:17:[value] entering loop for the first time

The next log entry which is not a progression message is a warning concerning variable tmp

There is no variable tmp in our file lib.c, but as indicated in the message, this variable is introduced by the source code normalization of the ptr++ expression. You can also see the relation between this variable and the original source code in the GUI. Alternately, the command frama-c *.c -print shows how the original source code has been transformed by Frama-C (note, however, that the location lib.c:18 refers to the original source file). Here, it is the statement *ptr++ = val; in the function memset that has been transformed by Frama-C into the sequence below, so that it would not be ambiguous which value of ptr has to be a valid pointer.

```
tmp = ptr;
ptr ++;
*tmp = (unsigned char)val;
```

The command frama-c *.c -val -print launches EVA and then prints the transformed source code, annotated with the alarms raised by EVA. In our case, the function memset is transformed in

```
void *memset(void *dest, int val, size_t len)
{
    unsigned char *ptr;
    ptr = (unsigned char *)dest;
```

¹It is a good idea to check again for missing functions because new execution paths could have been activated by the implementations of functions that were previously missing.

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```
while (1) {
   size_t tmp_0;
    unsigned char *tmp;
    { /* sequence */
     tmp_0 = len;
     len --;
   }
    if (! (tmp_0 > (size_t)0)) break;
    { /* sequence */
     tmp = ptr;
     ptr ++;
      /*@ assert Value: mem_access: \valid(tmp); */
     *tmp = (unsigned char)val;
   }
 }
  return dest;
}
```

As we will find out later in this tutorial, this alarm is a false alarm, an indication of a potential problem in a place where there is in fact none. On the other hand, EVA never remains silent when a risk of run-time error is present, unlike many other static analysis tools. The important consequence is that if you get the tool to remain silent, you have *formally verified* that no run-time error could happen when running the program.

It may seem that the access to *tmp is the only dangerous operation in the function memset, and therefore that the analyzer is not doing a very good job of pointing only the operations that are problematic. While it is true that the results obtained on this example are not very precise, the comparison > is also considered dangerous by the analyzer. This operation may be unspecified when applied to an invalid pointer. Consider a program that does the following:

```
1 int main()
2 {
3 int a;
4 return ((unsigned int)(&a - 1432)) > 0;
5 }
```

The programmer might misguidedly have written the >0 test in this example as a way to test for NULL. Ey² might expect this program always to return 1, since (&a - 1432) is not NULL. But this program may in fact return 0 if, out of bad luck, the compiler places variable a precisely at address 1432. This kind of bug would be very difficult to find and/or reproduce by testing.

The analyzer does not emit any alarm for the comparison tmp_0 > (size_t)0 in the normalized source code for memset, and this means that it guarantees³ that this particular comparison is never non-deterministic because of an issue such as the one just described. This conclusion can only be reached by looking at the arguments actually passed to the function memset. Therefore, this conclusion is only valid for all the possible executions coming from the main function that we provided, and not for all the possible calls to function memset that a programmer could write.

One should not spend too much time at this stage trying to determine if the dozens or so alarms emitted by the analyzer are true alarms that indicate an actual problem or false alarms

²This manual uses Spivak pronouns: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spivak_pronoun

 $^{^{3}}$ The fine print is the reference part of this manual

2.4. SEARCHING FOR BUGS

that don't. The most important information is that the analysis did not take an unreasonable time.

The GUI allows to inspect the sets of values obtained during the analysis and to get a feeling of how it works. Right-clicking on the function name in a function call brings a contextual menu that allows to go to the function's definition and to inspect it in turn. In order to return to the caller, right-clicking on the name of the current function at the top of the normalized code buffer brings a contextual menu with a list of callers. You can also use the Back button (left arrow) in the toolbar.

2.4 Searching for bugs

2.4.1 Increasing the precision with option -slevel

Because we compiled and executed the same program that we are now analyzing, we are confident that most of the alarms displayed by EVA are false alarms that do not correspond to actual problems. In fact, because the program is deterministic and takes no inputs, only one of the alarms can be a true alarm in the strictest sense. The analysis stops when an error is encountered (what would it even mean to continue the analysis after, for instance, NULL has been dereferenced?). It is only because EVA is uncertain about the errors encountered here that it continues and finds more possible errors.

Before we spend any of our time looking at each of these alarms, trying to determine whether it is true or false, it is a good idea to make the analyzer spend more of its time trying to determine whether each alarm is true or false. There are different settings that influence the compromise between precision and resource consumption. If you chose to remember only one of these settings, it would have to be the option -slevel. This option has two visible effects: it makes the analyzer unroll loops, and it makes it propagate separately the states that come from the then and else branches of a conditional statement. This makes the analysis more precise (at the cost of being slower) for almost every program that can be analyzed.

EVA has different ways to provide information on the loss of precision that causes the false alarms. This is another reason why it is so verbose during an analysis: it tries to provide enough information for a motivated user to be able to understand what is happening during the analysis, where the imprecise values that cause the false alarms came from, and what instructions in the program made them imprecise.

But instead of spending precious human time making use of the provided information, the brute-force approach of blindly applying the -slevel option must be tried first. Indeed, -slevel is one of the options of EVA that can never cause it to become incorrect. Such options, when used wrongly, may make the analysis slower, provide hints that are not useful, or even possibly counter-productive (making the analysis less precise), but they cannot prevent the analyzer from reporting a problem where there is one.

The -slevel option is useful for unrolling loops. We do not know without further inspection how many iterations the loops inside the program need, but the input message is 80 characters long, and we can assume that it is read inside a loop, so using the option -slevel 100 should have a good chance of unrolling at least that loop. Furthermore, it does not make the analysis slower to use a number greater than the value actually necessary to unroll every loop and conditional in the program. We are limiting ourselves to 100 in this first try because we do not know how much time the analysis will take with this number of unrolled branches. If, with the parameter -slevel 100, the precision of the analysis still isn't satisfactory and the time spent by the analyzer remains reasonable, we can always try a higher value. This should be progressive, because a value higher than a few hundreds, when there really are that many branches to unroll in the program, can make the analysis very slow.

frama-c -slevel 100 -val *.c >log

The analysis goes rather far without finding any alarm, but when it is almost done (after the analysis of function Skein_256_Final), it produces:

These messages mean that lvalue hash[i], as found in line 14 of our file main_1.c, may be uninitialized⁴. Actually, the analyzer finds that for one execution branch, it is certain to be uninitialized. This is when reading the memory location "hash[i]", one of the arguments given to the printf function. Extra information can be observed using the GUI, by clicking on the hash expression in line 14 and reading the Values tab, which displays the following values for hash:

 $[0] \in \{200\}$ $[1..7] \in UNINITIALIZED$

This means that element hash[0] has value 200, but elements 1 to 7 are definitely uninitialized. Therefore the first iteration of the loop proceeds as expected, but on the second iteration, the analysis of the branch is stopped, because from the point of view of the analyzer reading an uninitialized value should be a fatal error. And there are no other execution branches that reach the end of this loop, which is why the analyzer finds that function main does not terminate.

The next warning, accessing uninitialized left-value... is emitted whenever an accessed value may be uninitialized, and the emitted assertion, \initialized (&hash[i]), could not be verified by EVA, and must therefore be verified by other means (eventually, other Frama-C analyses) to ensure the behavior of the code is defined.

2.4.2 Making sense of alarms

There were three alarms in the analysis. The other two are related to interactions between the Frama-C standard library and our own implementations of $memset/memcpy^5$, but we can safely ignore them here.

⁴An lvalue is a C expression that exists in memory. Examples of lvalues are a simple variable \mathbf{x} , the cell of an array t[i], or a pointed location $*\mathbf{p}$. Because an lvalue lies in memory, it may have uninitialized contents. Using an lvalue when it has not yet been initialized is a forbidden behavior that compilers do not detect in all cases, and this is only one of the numerous pitfalls of C.

⁵Namely, the fact that their specifications involve *logic predicates* that are not yet understood by EVA leads to an "Unknown" status, even though they are valid in this case.

Furthermore, the program is also found not to terminate. This means that every execution either encounters the problem from line 14 in main_1.c, or an infinite loop somewhere else in the program. We should, therefore, pay particular attention to this alarm.

Looking again at the header file skein.h, we may now notice that in function Skein_256_Init, the formal parameter for the desired hash length is named hashBitLen. This parameter should certainly be expressed in bits! We were inadvertently asking for a 1-char hash of the message since the beginning, and the test that we ran as our first step failed to notice it. Our first imprecise analysis did find it – the same alarm that pointed out the problem is present among the other alarms produced by the first analysis. Note that because of the imprecisions, the first analysis was not able to conclude that the uninitialized access at hash[2] was certain, making it much less noticeable among the others.

The bug can be fixed by passing 8*HASHLEN instead of HASHLEN as the second argument of Skein_256_Init. With this fix in place, the analysis with -slevel 100 produces no alarms (apart from the postconditions of memcpy and memset) and gives the following result:

Values for function main:
hash[0]
$$\in$$
 {40}
[1] \in {234}
[2] \in {138}
[3] \in {230}
[4] \in {134}
[5] \in {120}
[6] \in {37}
[7] \in {35}
i \in {8}

Meanwhile, compiling and executing the fixed test produces the result:

2.5 Guaranteeing the absence of bugs

2.5.1 Generalizing the analysis to arbitrary messages of fixed length

The analysis we have done so far is very satisfying because it finds problems that are not detected by a C compiler or by testing. The results of this analysis only prove the absence of run-time errors⁶ when the particular message that we chose is being hashed, though. It would be much more useful to have the assurance that there are no run-time errors for any input message, especially since the library might be under consideration for embedding in a device where anyone (possibly a malicious user) will be able to choose the message to hash.

A first generalization of the previous analysis is to include in the subject matter the hashing of all possible 80-character messages. We can do this by separating the analyzed program in

 $^{^{6}\}mathrm{and}$ the absence of conditions that should be run-time errors – like the uninitialized access already encountered

two distinct phases, the first one being the construction of a generalized analysis context and the second one being made of the sequence of function calls that we wish to study:

```
main_2.c
```

```
#include "skein.h"
1
   #include "__fc_builtin.h"
2
3
   #define HASHLEN (8)
4
5
   u08b_t msg[80];
6
7
   int Frama_C_interval(int,int);
8
9
   void main(void)
10
11
   ł
12
      int i;
     u08b t hash[HASHLEN];
13
      Skein_256_Ctxt_t skein_context;
14
15
      for (i=0; i<80; i++) msg[i]=Frama_C_interval(0, 255);</pre>
16
17
      Skein_256_Init( &skein_context, HASHLEN * 8);
18
19
      Skein_256_Update( &skein_context, msg, 80);
      Skein_256_Final( &skein_context, hash);
20
   }
21
```

From this point onward the program is no longer executable because of the call to builtin primitives such as Frama_C_interval. We therefore dispense with the final calls to printf, since EVA offers simpler ways to observe intermediate and final results. Note that we included __fc_builtin.h, a file that comes from the Frama-C distribution and which defines Frama_C_interval. Running Frama-C on this file (without main_1.c in the same directory, to avoid having two definitions for main):

frama-c -slevel 100 -val *.c >log 2>&1

This time, the absence of actual alarms is starting to be really interesting: it means that it is formally excluded that the functions Skein_256_Init, Skein_256_Update, and Skein_256_Final produce a run-time error when they are used, in this order, to initialize a local variable of type Skein_256_Ctxt_t (with argument 64 for the size), parse an arbitrary message and produce a hash in a local u08b_t array of size 8.

2.5.2 Verifying functional dependencies

If we had written a formal specification for function Skein, we would soon have expressed that we expected it to modify the buffer hash that is passed to Skein_256_Final (all 8 bytes of the buffer), to compute the new contents of this buffer from the contents of the input buffer msg (all 80 bytes of it), and from nothing else.

During EVA's analysis, we have seen that all of the buffer hash was always modified in the conditions of the analysis: the reason is that this buffer was uninitialized before the sequence of calls, and guaranteed to be initialized after them.

We can get the complete list of locations that may be modified by each function by adding the option -out to the other options we were already using. These locations are computed in a quick analysis that comes after EVA. In the results of this analysis, we find:

The "(internal)" reminds us that this list includes the local variables of main that have been modified. Indeed, all the variables that we could expect to appear in the list are here: the input buffer, that we initialized to all possible arbitrary 80-char messages; the loop index that we used in doing so; the output buffer for receiving the hash; and Skein's internal state, that was indirectly modified by us when we called the functions Init, Update and Final.

If we want the outputs of the sequence to appear more clearly, without the variables we used for instrumenting, we can put it in its own function:

```
u08b_t hash[HASHLEN];
2
   void do_Skein_256(void)
3
   {
4
5
     Skein_256_Ctxt_t skein_context;
     Skein_256_Init( &skein_context, HASHLEN * 8);
6
     Skein_256_Update( &skein_context, msg, 80);
7
     Skein_256_Final( &skein_context, hash);
8
   }
9
10
11
   void main(void)
   ſ
12
     int i;
13
14
     for (i=0; i<80; i++) msg[i]=Frama_C_interval(0, 255);</pre>
15
16
     do_Skein_256();
17
   }
18
```

Using option **-out-external** in order to obtain lists of locations that exclude each function's local variables, we get:

This means that no location other than hash[0..7] was modified by the sequence of calls to Skein-256 functions. It doesn't mean that each of the cells of the array was overwritten: we have to rely on the results of EVA when hash was a local variable for that result. But it means that when used in conformance with the pattern in this program, the functions do not accidentally modify a global variable. We can conclude from this analysis that the functions are re-entrant as long as the concurrent computations are being made with separate contexts and destination buffers.

Keeping the convenient function do_Skein_256 for modeling the sequence, let us now compute the functional dependencies of each function. Functional dependencies list, for each output location, the input locations that influence the final contents of this output location:

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```
.b[0..31] FROM ctx (and SELF)
  \ result FROM \nothing
Function Skein 256 Update:
  skein_context.h.bCnt FROM skein_context.h.bCnt; ctx; msgByteCnt
              .h.T[0] FROM skein_context.h{.bCnt; .T[0]; }; ctx; msgByteCnt
              .h.T[1] FROM skein context{.h.bCnt; .h.T[1]; }; ctx;
                         msgByteCnt
              {.X[0..3]; .b[0..15]; } FROM msg[0..79];
                                        skein_context{.h{.bCnt; .T[0..1]; };
                                                      .X[0..3]; .b[0..31]; };
                                         ctx; msg_0; msgByteCnt (and SELF)
  \ result FROM \nothing
Function Skein_256_Final:
 hash[0..7] FROM msg[0..79]; skein_context; ctx;
                hashVal; ONE[bits 0 to 7] (and SELF)
  skein_context.h.bCnt FROM skein_context.h.hashBitLen; ctx (and SELF)
              .h.T[0] FROM skein_context.h{.hashBitLen; .bCnt; .T[0]; }; ctx
              .h.T[1] FROM skein_context{.h.hashBitLen; .h.T[1]; }; ctx
              {.X[0..3]; .b[0..15]; } FROM msg[0..79]; skein_context;
                                        ctx; ONE[bits 0 to 7] (and SELF)
              .b[16..31] FROM skein_context.h.bCnt; ctx (and SELF)
  \ result FROM \nothing
```

The functional dependencies for the functions Init, Update and Final are quite cryptic. They refer to fields of the struct skein_context. We have not had to look at this struct yet, but its type Skein_256_Ctxt_t is declared in file skein.h.

In the results, the mention (and SELF) means that parts of the output location may keep their previous values. Conversely, absence of this mention means that the output location is guaranteed to have been completely over-written when the function returns. For instance, the field skein_context.h.T[0] is guaranteed to be over-written with a value that depends only on various other subfields of skein_context.h. On the other hand, the -deps analysis does not guarantee that all cells of hash are over-written — but we previously saw we could deduce this information from EVA's results.

Since we don't know how the functions are supposed to work, it is difficult to tell if these dependencies are normal or reveal a problem. Let us move on to the functional dependencies of do_Skein_256:

```
Function do_Skein_256:
hash[0..7] FROM msg[0..79]; ONE[bits 0 to 7] (and SELF)
```

These dependencies make the effect of the functions clearer. The FROM msg[0..79] part is what we expect. The and SELF mention is an unfortunate approximation. The dependency on global variable ONE reveals an implementation detail of the library (the variable is used to detect endianness dynamically). Finding out about this variable is a good thing: it shows that a possibility for a malicious programmer to corrupt the implementation into hashing the same message to different digests would be to try to change the value of ONE between computations. Checking the source code for mentions of variable ONE, we can see it is used to detect endianness and is declared const. On an MMU-equipped platform, there is little risk that this variable could be modified maliciously from the outside. However, this is a vivid example of how static analysis, and especially correct analyses as provided in Frama-C, can complement code reviews in improving trust in existing C code.

2.5. GUARANTEEING THE ABSENCE OF BUGS

Assuming that variable ONE keeps its value, a same input message is guaranteed always to be hashed by this sequence of calls to the same digest, because option -deps says that there is no other memory location hash is computed from, not even an internal state.

A stronger property to verify would be that the sequence Init(...), Update(...,80), Final(...) computes the same hash as when the same message is passed in two calls Update(...,40). This property is beyond the reach of EVA. In the advanced tutorial, we show how to verify easier properties for sequences of calls that include several calls to Update.

2.5.3 Generalizing to arbitrary numbers of Update calls

As an exercise, try to verify that there cannot be a run-time error when hashing arbitrary contents by calling Update(...,80) an arbitrary number of times between Init and Final. The general strategy is to modify the C analysis context we have already written in a way such that it is evident that it captures all such sequences of calls, and also in a way that launched with adequate options, EVA does not emit any warning.

The latter condition is harder than the former. Observing results (with the GUI or observation functions described in section 8.3) can help to iterate towards a solution. Be creative. The continuation of this tutorial can be found online at http://blog.frama-c.com/index.php? tag/skein; read available posts in chronological order.



Chapter 3 What EVA provides

Here begins the reference section of this manual. This chapter categorizes and describes the outputs of EVA.

3.1 Values

The EVA plug-in accepts queries for the value of a variable x at a given program point. It answers such a query with an over-approximation of the set of values possibly taken by x at the designated point for all possible executions.

3.1.1 Variation domains for expressions

The variation domain of a variable or expression can take one of the shapes described below.

A set of integers

The analyzer may have determined the variation domain of a variable is a set of integers. This usually happens for variables of an integer type, but may happen for other variables if the application contains unions or casts. A set of integers can be represented as:

- an enumeration, $\{v_1; \ldots, v_n\}$,
- an interval, [l..u], that represents all the integers comprised between l and u. If "--" appears as the lower bound l (resp. the upper bound u), it means that the lower bound (resp upper bound) is $-\infty$ (resp. $+\infty$),
- an interval with periodicity information, [l..u], r m, that represents the set of values comprised between l and u whose remainder in the Euclidean division by m is equal to r. For instance, [2..42], 2%10, represents the set that contains 2, 12, 22, 32, and 42.

A floating-point value or interval

A location in memory (typically a floating-point variable) may also contain a floating-point number or an interval of floating-point numbers:

- f for the non-zero floating-point number f (the floating-point number +0.0 has the same representation as the integer 0 and is identified with it),
- $[f_l \dots f_u]$ for the interval from f_l to f_u inclusive.

A set of addresses

A variation domain (for instance for a pointer variable) may be a set of addresses, denoted by $\{\{a_1; \ldots, a_n\}\}$. Each a_i is of the form:

- &x + D, where &x is the base address corresponding to the variable x, and D is in the domain of integer values and represents the possible offsets expressed in bytes with respect to the base address &x. When x is an array or an aggregate, and D corresponds to the offset(s) of a field or an array cell, a concrete C-like syntax may be used, i.e. &t{[1].i1, [2].i2}.
- NULL + D, which denotes absolute addresses (seen as offsets with respect to the base address NULL).
- "foo" + D, which denotes offsets from a literal string with contents "foo".

In all three cases, "+D" is omitted if D is {0}, that is, when there is no offset.

An imprecise mix of addresses

If the application involves, or seems to involve, unusual arithmetic operations over addresses, many of the variation domains provided by the analysis may be imprecise sets of the form garbled mix of $\&\{x_1; \ldots x_n\}$. This expression denotes an unknown value built from applying arithmetic operations to the addresses of variables x_1, \ldots, x_n and to integers.

Absolutely anything

You should not observe it in practice, but sometimes the analyzer is not able to deduce any information at all on the value of a variable, in which case it displays ANYTHING for the variation domain of this variable.

3.1.2 Memory contents

Memory locations can contain, in addition to the above sets of values, uninitialized data and dangling pointers. It is illegal to use these special values in computations, which is why they are not listed as possible values for an expression. Reading from a variable that appears to be uninitialized causes an alarm to be emitted, and then the set of values for the variable is made of those initialized values that were found at the memory location.

3.1.3 Interpreting the variation domains

Most modern C compilation platforms unify integer values and absolute addresses: there is no difference between the encoding of the integer 256 and that of the address (char*)0x00000100. Therefore, EVA does not distinguish between these two values either. It is partly for this reason that offsets D are expressed in bytes in domains of the form {{& $x + D; ...}$ }.

In floating-point computations, EVA considers that obtaining NaN, $+\infty$, or $-\infty$ is an unwanted error. The floating-point intervals provided by the analysis are always intervals of finite floating-point values.

Examples of variation domains

- [1..256] represents the set of integers comprised between 1 and 256, each of which can also be interpreted as an absolute address between 0x1 and 0x100.
- [0..256],0%2 represents the set of even integers comprised between 0 and 256. This set is also the set of the addresses of the first 129 aligned 16-bit words in memory.
- [1..255],1%2 represents the odd integers comprised between 1 and 255.
- [--..-] represents the set of all (possibly negative) integers that fit within the type of the variable or expression that is being printed.
- 3. represents the floating-point number 3.0.
- [-3. .. 9.] represents the interval of floating-point values comprised between -3.0 and 9.0.
- [--. .. 3.4] is a special notation for floating-point values, used only when emitting an alarm. The special bound --. indicates that the value may be either $+\infty$ or $-\infty$, depending on the side of the interval.
- {{ &x }} represents the address of the variable x.
- {{ &x + { 0; 1 } }} represents the address of one of the first two bytes of variable x assuming x is of a type at least 2 bytes in size. Otherwise, this notation represents a set containing the address of x and an invalid address.
- {{ &x ; &y }} represents the addresses of x and y.
- {{ &t + [0..256],0%4 }}, in an application where t is declared as an array of 32-bit integers, represents the addresses of locations t[0], t[1], ..., t[64].
- {{ &t + [0..256] }} represents the same values as the expression (char*)t+i where the variable i has an integer value comprised between 0 and 256.
- {{ &t + [--..-] }} represents all the addresses obtained by shifting t, including some misaligned and invalid ones.

3.1.4 Origins of approximations

Approximated values may contain information about the origin of the approximations. In this case the value is shown as "garbled mix of $\&\{x_1; \ldots, x_n\}$ (origin: ...)". The text provided after "origin:" indicates the location and the cause of some of these approximations.

Most origins are of the form Cause L, where L is an (optional) line or the application indicating where the approximation took place. Origin causes are one of the following:

Misaligned read

The origin Misaligned L indicates that misaligned reads prevented the computation to be precise. A misaligned read is a memory read-access where the bits read were not previously written as a single write that modified the whole set of bits exactly.

An example of a program leading to a misaligned read is the following:

```
1 int x,y;
2 int *t[2] = { &x, &y };
3
4 int main(void)
5 {
6 return 1 + (int) * (int*) ((int) t + 2);
7 }
```

The value returned by the function main is

{{ garbled mix of &{ x; y } (origin: Misaligned { misa.c:6 }) }}.

The analyzer is by default configured for a 32-bit architecture, and that consequently the read memory access is not an out-of-bound access. If it was, an alarm would be emitted, and the analysis would go in a different direction.

With the default target platform, the read access remains within the bounds of array t, but due to the offset of two bytes, the 32-bit word read is made of the last two bytes from t[0] and the first two bytes from t[1].

Call to an unknown function

The origin Library function L is used for the result of recursive functions or calls to function pointers whose value is not known precisely.

Fusion of values with different alignments

The notation Merge L that memory states with incompatible alignments are fused together. In the example below, the memory states from the then branch and from the else branch contain in the array t some 32-bit addresses with incompatible alignments.

```
int x,y;
1
   char t[8];
2
3
   int main(int c)
4
5
   {
      if (c)
6
        * (int**) t = &x;
7
8
        * (int**) (t+2) = &y;
9
     x = t[2];
10
      return x;
11
   }
12
```

The value returned by function main is {{ garbled mix of &{ x; y } (origin: Merge { merge.c:10 }) }}.

Well value

When generating an initial state to start the analysis from (see section 5.2.3 for details), the analyzer has to generate a set of possible values for a variable with only its type for information. Some recursive or deeply chained types may force the generated contents for the variable to contain imprecise, absorbing values called well values.

Computations that are imprecise because of a well value are marked as origin: Well.

Arithmetic operation

The origin Arithmetic L indicates that arithmetic operations take place without the analyzer being able to represent the result precisely.

```
1 int x,y;
2 int f(void)
3 {
4 return (int) &x + (int) &y;
5 }
```

In this example, the return value for f is
{{ garbled mix of &{ x; y } (origin: Arithmetic { ari.c:4 }) }}.

3.2 What is checked by EVA

EVA warns about possible run-time errors in the analyzed program, through the means of *proof obligations*: the errors that cannot be proved by the EVA plug-in are left to be proved by other plug-ins. These proof obligations are displayed as messages that contain the word assert in the textual log. Within Frama-C's AST, they are also available ACSL predicates. (Frama-C comes with a common specification language for all plug-ins, called ACSL, described at http://frama-c.com/acsl.html.)

When using the GUI version of Frama-C, proof obligations are inserted in the normalized source code. With the batch version, option -print produces a version of the analyzed source code annotated with the proofs obligations. The companion option -ocode <file.c> allows to specify a filename for the annotated source code to be written to.

Invalid memory accesses

Whenever EVA is not able to establish that a dereferenced pointer is valid, it emits an alarm that expresses that the pointer needs to be valid at that point. Likewise, direct array accesses that may be invalid are flagged.

```
int i, t[10], *p;
1
   void main()
2
   {
3
     for (i=0; i<=10; i++)
4
       if (unknownfun()) t[i] = i;
5
    p = t + 12;
6
     if (unknownfun()) *p = i;
7
    p[-6] = i;
8
9 }
```

In the above example, the analysis is not able to guarantee that the memory accesses t[i] and *p are valid, so it emits a proof obligation for each:

invalid.c:5: ... accessing out of bounds index. assert i < 10; invalid.c:7: ... out of bounds write. assert \valid(p);

(Notice that no alarm assert $0 \le i$ is emitted, as the analysis is able to guarantee that this always holds.)

The choice between these two kinds of alarms is influenced by option -unsafe-arrays, as described page 62.

Note that line 6 or 8 in this example could be considered as problematic in the strictest interpretation of the standard. EVA omits warnings for these two lines according to the attitude described in 4.5.1. An option to warn about these lines could happen if there was demand for this feature.

Division by zero

When dividing by an expression that the analysis is not able to guarantee non-null, a proof obligation is emitted. This obligation expresses that the divisor is different from zero at this point of the code.

In the particular case where zero is the only possible value for the divisor, the analysis stops the propagation of this execution path. If the divisor seems to be able to take non-null values, the analyzer is allowed to take into account the property that the divisor is different from zero when it continues the analysis after this point. The property expressed by an alarm may also not be taken into account when it is not easy to do so.

```
int A, B;
void main(int x, int y)
{
    A = 100 / (x * y);
    B = 333 % x;
}
div.c:4: ... division by zero. assert (int)(x*y) != 0;
div.c:5: ... division by zero. assert x != 0;
```

In the above example, there is no way for the analyzer to guarantee that x*y is not null, so it emits an alarm at line 4. In theory, it could avoid emitting the alarm x != 0 at line 5 because this property is a consequence of the property emitted as an alarm at line 4. Redundant alarms happen – even in cases simpler than this one. Do not be surprised by them.

Undefined logical shift

Another arithmetic alarm is the alarm emitted for logical shift operations on integers where the second operand may be larger than the size in bits of the first operand's type. Such an operation is left undefined by the ISO/IEC 9899:1999 standard, and indeed, processors are often built in a way that such an operation does not produce the 0 or -1 result that could have been expected. Here is an example of program with such an issue, and the resulting alarm:

```
1 void main(int c){
2     int x;
3     c = c ? 1 : 8 * sizeof(int);
4     x = 1 << c;
5 }</pre>
```

shift .c:4: ... invalid RHS operand for shift. assert 0 <= c < 32;</pre>

The ISO C99 standard also forbids left-shifting a negative integer. This is also detected by EVA.

```
void main(int c){
    int x;
    x = -7,
    x = x << 2;
}</pre>
```

lshift.c:4:[kernel] warning: invalid LHS operand for left shift. assert 0 <= x;</pre>

Overflow in integer arithmetic

By default, EVA emits alarms for — and reduces the sets of possible results of — signed arithmetic computations where the possibility of an overflow exists. Indeed, such overflows have an undefined behavior according to paragraph 6.5.5 of the ISO/IEC 9899:1999 standard. If useful, it is also possible to assume that signed integers overflow according to a 2's complement representation. The option -no-warn-signed-overflow can be used to this end. A reminder message is nevertheless emitted operations that are detected as potentially overflowing. Regardless of the value of option -warn-signed-overflow, a warning is emitted on signed arithmetic operations applied to the cast to signed int of an address, since the compiler may place variables in memory at will.

By default, no alarm is emitted for arithmetic operations on unsigned integers for which an overflow may happen, since such operations have defined semantics according to the ISO/IEC 9899:1999 standard. If one wishes to signal and prevent such unsigned overflows, option -warn-unsigned-overflow can be used.

Finally, no alarm is emitted for downcasts to signed or unsigned integers. In the signed case, the least significant bits of the original value are used, and are interpreted according to 2's complement representation. Frama-C's options -warn-signed-downcast and -warn-unsigned-downcast are not honored by EVA. The RTE plug-in can be used to generate the relevant assertions before starting an analysis.

Overflow in conversion from floating-point to integer

An alarm is emitted when a floating-point value appears to exceed the range of the integer type it is converted to.

```
#include "__fc_builtin.h"
1
2
  int main()
3
  {
4
     float f = Frama_C_float_interval(2e9, 3e9);
5
    return (int) f;
6
  }
7
  ov_float_int.c:6:[kernel] warning: overflow in conversion from floating-point
   to integer. assert -2147483649 < f < 2147483648;
  [value] Values at end of function main:
  f \in [200000000...300000000.]
  \_retres \in [2000000000..2147483647]
```

Floating-point alarms

When it appears that a floating-point operation can result in an infinite value or NaN, the analyzer emits an alarm that excludes these possibilities, and continues the analysis with an interval representing the result obtained if excluding these possibilities. This interval, like any other result, may be over-approximated. An example of this first kind of alarm can be seen in the following example.

An alarm is also emitted when the program uses as argument to a floating-point operation a value from memory that does not ostensibly represent a floating-point number. This can happen with a union type with both int and float fields, or in the case of a conversion from int* to float*. The emitted alarm excludes the possibility of the bit sequence used as a the argument representing NaN, an infinite, or an address. See the example below.

```
union { int i ; float f ; } bits;
2
3
   float r;
4
  int main () {
5
    bits.i = unknown_fun();
6
    r = 1.0 + bits.f;
7
     return r > 0.;
8
9
  }
  frama-c -val double_op_arg.c
  double_op_arg.c:7:[kernel] warning: non-finite float value:
      assert \ is_finite (bits.f);
```

Uninitialized variables and dangling pointers to local variables

An alarm may be emitted if the application appears to read the value of a local variable that has not been initialized, or if it appears to manipulate the address of a local variable outside of the scope of said variable. Both issues occur in the following example:

```
int *f(int c)
    {
\mathbf{2}
      int r, t, *p;
3
      if (c) r = 2;
4
      t = r + 3;
5
6
      return &t;
7
   }
8
   int main(int c)
9
10
   {
      int *p;
11
```

```
12  p = f(c);
13  return *p;
14 }
```

EVA emits alarms for lines 5 (variable r may be uninitialized) and 13 (a dangling pointer to local variable t is used).

By default, EVA does not emit an alarm for a copy from memory to memory when the copied values include dangling addresses or uninitialized contents. This behavior is safe because EVA warns later, as soon as an unsafe value is used in a computation —either directly or after having been copied from another location. The copy operations for which alarms are not emitted are assignments from lvalues to lvalues (1v1 = 1v2;), passing lvalues as arguments to functions (f(1v1);), and returning lvalues (return 1v1;). An exception is made for lvalues passed as arguments to library functions: in this case, because the function's code is missing, there is no chance to catch the undefined access later; the analyzer emits an alarm at the point of the call.

The behavior documented above was implemented to avoid spurious warnings where the copied lvalues are structs or unions. In some cases, it may be normal for some fields in a struct or union to contain such dangerous contents.

Option -val-warn-copy-indeterminate can be used to obtain a more aggressive behavior on scalar variables. Specifying -val-warn-copy-indeterminate f on the command-line will cause the analyzer to also emit an alarm on all dangerous copy operations occurring in function f, as long as the copied lvalues are not structs or unions. The syntax **@all** can also be used to activate this behavior for all functions.

Undefined pointer comparison alarms

Proof obligations can also be emitted for pointer comparisons whose results may vary from one compilation to another, such as &a < &b or &x+2 != NULL. These alarms do not necessarily correspond to run-time errors, but relying on an undefined behavior of the compiler is in general undesirable (although this one is rather benign for current compilation platforms).

Although these alarms may seem unimportant, they should still be checked, because EVA may reduce the propagated states accordingly to the emitted alarm. For instance, for the &x+2 != NULL comparison, after emitting the alarm that the quantity &x+2 must be reliably comparable to 0, the analysis assumes that the result of the comparison is 1. The consequences are visible when analyzing the following example:

```
int x,y,*p;
main(){
    p = &x;
    while (p++ != &y);
}
```

EVA finds that this program does not terminate. This seems incorrect because an actual execution will terminate on most architectures. However, EVA's conclusion is conditioned by an alarm emitted for the pointer comparison.

EVA only allows pointer comparisons that give reproducible results — that is, the possibility of obtaining an unspecified result for a pointer comparison is considered as an unwanted error, and is excluded by the emission of an alarm.

The analyzer can be instructed to propagate past these undefined pointer comparisons with option -undefined-pointer-comparison-propagate-all. With this option, in the example program above, the values 0 and 1 are considered as results for the condition as soon as p becomes an invalid address. Therefore, EVA does not predict that the program does not terminate.

Conversely, verifications for undefined pointer comparisons can be deactivated using option -val-warn-undefined-pointer-comparison. The possible settings are:

- none: never emit a pointer comparison alarm;
- pointer: emit an alarm only when the arguments of the comparison have pointer type;
- all: emit an alarm in all cases, including when comparing scalars that the analysis has inferred as possibly containing pointers.

Undefined side-effects in expressions

The C language allows compact notations for modifying a variable that is being accessed (for instance, y = x++;). The effect of these pre- or post-increment (or decrement) operators is undefined when the variable is accessed elsewhere in the same statement. For instance, y = x + x++; is undefined: the code generated by the compiler may have any effect, and especially not the effect expected by the programmer.

Sometimes, it is not obvious whether the increment operation is defined. In the example y = *p + x++;, the post-increment is defined as long as *p does not have any bits in common with x.

```
1
   int x, y, z, t, *p, *q;
   void main(int c)
2
   {
3
     if (c&1)
4
       y = x + x++;
5
     p = c\&2 ? \&x : \&t;
6
7
     y = *p + x++;
     q = c\&4 ? \&z : \&t;
8
9
     y = *q + x++;
10
```

frama-c -val se.c -unspecified-access

With option -unspecified-access, three warnings are emitted during parsing. Each of these only mean that an expression with side-effects will require checking after the Abstract Syntax Tree has been elaborated. For instance, the first of these warnings is:

Then EVA is run on the program. In the example at hand, the analysis finds problems at lines 5 and 7.

se.c:5: ... undefined multiple accesses in expression. assert \separated(&x, &x); se.c:7: ... undefined multiple accesses in expression. assert \separated(&x, p);

At line 5, it can guarantee that an undefined behavior exists, and the analysis is halted. For line 7, it is not able to guarantee that p does not point to x, so it emits a proof obligation. Since it cannot guarantee that p always points to x either, the analysis continues. Finally, it does not warn for line 9, because it is able to determine that *q is z or t, and that the expression *q + x++ is well defined.

Another example of statement which deserves an alarm is y = f() + g();. For this statement, it is unspecified which function will be called first. If one of them modifies global variables that are read by the other, different results can be obtained depending on factors outside the programmer's control. At this time, EVA does not check if these circumstances occur, and silently chooses an order for calling f and g. The statement y = f() + x++; does not emit any warning either, although it would be desirable to do so if f reads or writes into variable x. These limitations will be addressed in a future version.

Partially overlapping lvalue assignment

Vaguely related to, but different from, undefined side-effects in expressions, EVA warns about the following program:

```
1
    struct S { int a; int b; int c; };
2
   struct T { int p; struct S s; };
3
4
   union U { struct S s; struct T t; } u;
5
6
7
   void copy(struct S *p, struct S *q)
8
   {
     *p = *q;
9
   }
10
11
   int main(int c, char **v){
12
     u.s.b = 1;
13
     copy(&u.t.s, &u.s);
14
      return u.t.s.a + u.t.s.b + u.t.s.c;
15
16 }
```

The programmer thought ey was invoking implementation-defined behavior in the above program, using an union to type-pun between structs S and T. Unfortunately, this program returns 1 when compiled with clang -m32; it returns 2 when compiled with clang -m32 -02, and it returns 0 when compiled with gcc -m32.

For a program as simple as the above, all these compilers are supposed to implement the same implementation-defined choices. Which compiler, if we may ask such a rhetorical question, is right? They all are, because the program is undefined. When function copy() is called from main(), the assignment *p = *q; breaks C99's 6.5.16.1:3 rule. This rule states that in an assignment from lvalue to lvalue, the left and right lvalues must overlap either exactly or not at all.

The program breaking this rule means compilers neither have to emit warnings (none of the above did) nor produce code that does what the programmer intended, whatever that was. Launched on the above program, EVA says:

```
partially overlapping lvalue assignment. assert p == q || \separated(p, q);
```

By choice, EVA does not emit alarms for overlapping assignments of size less than int, for which reading and writing are deemed atomic operations. Finding the exact cut-off point for these warnings would require choosing a specific compiler and looking at the assembly it generates for a large number of C constructs. Contact us if you need such fine-tuning of the analyzer for a specific target platform and compiler.

Invalid function pointer access

When EVA encounters a statement of the form (*e)(x); and is unable to guarantee that expression e evaluates to a valid function address, an alarm is emitted. This includes invalid pointers (such as NULL), or pointers to a function with an incompatible type. In the latter case, an alarm is emitted, but EVA may nevertheless proceed with the analysis if it can give some meaning to the call. This is meant to account for frequent misconceptions on type compatibility (e.g. void * and int * are *not* compatible).

```
extern void * f1();
   extern void f2(int);
2
3
   void main(int c) {
4
     int * (*p)(int);
5
     void *x, *y;
6
7
     p = \& f1;
8
     x = (*p)(c); // Alarm, but the analysis proceeds
9
10
     p = \&f2;
11
     y = (*p)(c); // Call deemed entirely invalid
12
   }
13
   valid_function.c:9:[kernel] warning: pointer to function with incompatible type.
          assert \valid_function(p);
   valid_function.c:9:[kernel] warning: Neither code nor specification for
          function f1, generating default assigns from the prototype
   [value] using specification for function f1
   valid_function.c:12:[kernel] warning: pointer to function with incompatible type.
          assert \valid_function(p);
   valid_function.c:12:[value] assertion 'Value,function_pointer' got final status
          invalid.
```

3.3 Log messages emitted by EVA

This section categorizes the non-alarms related messages displayed by EVA in frama-c, the batch version of the analyzer. When using frama-c-gui (the graphical interface), the messages are directed to different panels in the bottom right of the main window for easier access.

3.3.1 Results

With the batch version of Frama-C, all computation results, messages and warnings are displayed on the standard output. However, a compromise regarding verbosity had to be reached. Although variation domains for variables are available for any point in the execution of the analyzed application, the batch version only displays, for each function, the values that hold whenever the end of this function is reached.

3.3.2 Informational messages regarding propagation

Some messages warn that the analysis is making an operation likely to cause loss of precision. Other messages warn the user that unusual circumstances have been encountered by EVA.

In both these cases, the messages are not proof obligations and it is not mandatory for the user to act on them. They can be distinguished from proof obligations by the fact that they do **not** use the word "assert". These messages are intended to help the user trace the results of the analysis, and give as much information as possible in order to help em find when and why the analysis becomes imprecise. These messages are only useful when it is important to analyze the application with precision. EVA remains correct even when it is imprecise.

Examples of messages that result from the apparition of imprecision in the analysis are:

```
origin.c:14:[value] assigning imprecise value to pa1.
The imprecision originates from Arithmetic {origin.c:14}
origin.c:15:[value] writing somewhere in {ta1}
because of Arithmetic {origin.c:14}.
```

Examples of messages that correspond to unusual circumstances are:

alloc.c:20: ... all target addresses were invalid. This path is assumed to be dead. origin.i:86: ... local escaping the scope of local_escape_1 through esc2

3.4 About these alarms the user is supposed to check...

When writing a Frama-C plug-in to assist in reverse-engineering source code, it does not really make sense to expect the user to check the alarms that are emitted by EVA. Consider for instance Frama-C's slicing plug-in. This plug-in produces a simplified version of a program. It is often applied to large unfamiliar codebases; if the user is at the point where ey needs a slicer to make sense of the codebase, it's probably a bad time to require em to check alarms on the original unsliced version.

The slicer and other code comprehension plug-ins work around this problem by defining the results they provide as "valid for well-defined executions". In the case of the slicer, this is really the only definition that makes sense. Consider the following code snippet:

```
1  x = a;
2  y = *p;
3  x = x+1;
4  // slice for the value of x here.
```

This piece of program is begging for its second line to be removed, but if p can be the NULL pointer, the sliced program behaves differently from the original: the original program exits abruptly on most architectures, whereas the sliced version computes the value of x.

It is fine to ignore alarms in this context, but the user of a code comprehension plug-in based on EVA should study the categorization of alarms in section 3.2 with particular care. Because EVA is more aggressive in trying to extract precise information from the program than other analyzers, the user is more likely to observe incorrect results if there is a misunderstanding between him and the tool about what assumptions should be made.

CHAPTER 3. WHAT EVA PROVIDES

Everybody agrees that accessing an invalid pointer is an unwanted behavior, but what about comparing two pointers with <= in an undefined manner or assuming that a signed overflow wraps around in 2's complement representation? Function memmove, for instance, typically does the former when applied to two addresses with different bases. Yet, currently, if there appears to be an undefined pointer comparison, EVA propagates a state that may contain only "optimistic" (assuming the undefined circumstances do not occur) results for the comparison result and for the pointers.¹

It is possible to take advantage of EVA for program comprehension, and all existing program comprehension tools need to make assumptions about undefined behaviors. Most tools do not tell whether they had to make assumptions or not. EVA does: each alarm, in general, is also an assumption. Still, as implementation progresses and EVA becomes able to extract more information from the alarms it emits, one or several options to configure it either not to emit some alarms, or not to make the corresponding assumptions, will certainly become necessary. This is a consequence of the nature of the C language, very partially defined by a standard that also tries to act as lowest common denominator of existing implementations, and at the same time used for low-level programming where strong hypotheses on the underlying architecture are needed.

3.5 API

Both the user (through the GUI) or a Frama-C plug-in can request the evaluation, at a specific statement, of an lvalue (or an arbitrary expression). The variation domain thus obtained contains all the values that this lvalue or expression may have anytime an actual execution reaches the selected statement.

In fact, from the point view of EVA, the graphical interface that allows to observe the values of variables in the program is very much an ordinary Frama-C plug-in. It uses the same functions (registered in module Db.Value) as other plug-ins that interface with EVA. This API is not very well documented yet, but one early external plug-in author used the GUI to get a feeling of what EVA could provide, and then used the OCaml source code of the GUI as a reference for obtaining this information programmatically.

3.5.1 EVA API overview

The function !Db.Value.access is one of the functions provided to custom plug-ins. It takes a program point (of type Cil_types.kinstr), the representation of an lvalue (of type Cil_types.lval) and returns a representation of the possible values for the lvalue at the program point.

Another function, !Db.Value.lval_to_loc, translates the representation of an lvalue into a location (of type Locations.location), which is the analyzer's abstract representation for a place in memory. The location returned by this function is free of memory accesses or arithmetic. The provided program point is used for instantiating the values of variables that appear in expressions inside the lvalue (array indices, dereferenced expressions). Thanks to this and similar functions, a custom plug-in may reason entirely in terms of abstract locations, and completely avoid the problems of pointers and aliasing.

¹As explained earlier, in this particular case, it is possible to get all possible behaviors using option -undefined-pointer-comparison-propagate-all.

The Frama-C Plug-in Development Guide contains more information about developing a custom plug-in.



Chapter 4 Limitations and specificities

Nobody is perfect.

This chapter describes how the difficult constructs in the C language are handled in EVA. The constructs listed here are difficult for all static analyzers in general. Different static analysis techniques can often be positioned with respect to each other by looking only at how they handle loops, function calls and partial codebases.

EVA works best on embedded code or embedded-like code without multithreading, although it is usable (with modeling work from the user) on applications that include it. Dynamic allocation is supported in limited form, but imprecisions may accumulate quickly (e.g. linked lists often lead to suboptimal results).

4.1 **Prospective features**

EVA does not check all the properties that could be expected of it¹. Support for each of these missing features could arrive if the need was expressed. Below are some of the existing limitations.

4.1.1 Strict aliasing rules

EVA does not check that the analyzed program uses pointer casts in a way that is compatible with strict aliasing rules. This is one of the major current issues of the C world because compilers only recently began to take advantage of these rules for optimization purposes. However, the issue has passed unnoticed for critical embedded code, because for various reasons including traceability, this code is compiled with most optimizations disabled.

 $^{^1\}mathrm{There}$ are 245 unspecified or undefined behaviors in Annex J of the ISO C99 standard.

4.1.2 Const attribute inside aggregate types

Some memory locations can be read from but not written to. An example of such a memory location is a constant string literal ("foo"). The ACSL specification language sports a predicate \valid_read to express that a memory location is valid for reading but does not have to be valid for writing. Accordingly, EVA emits alarms using \valid_read (lv) when an lvalue lv is read from, and \valid (lv) when lv is written to.

Variables with a const-qualified type are among the memory locations that EVA knows to be good to read from but forbidden to write to. However, the const type qualifier is currently only handled when placed at the top-level of the type of a global variable or formal argument. Other const locations are considered writable.

4.1.3 Alignment of memory accesses

EVA currently does not check that memory accesses are properly aligned in memory. It assumes that non-aligned accesses have only a small time penalty (instead of causing an exception) and that the programmer is aware of this penalty and is accessing (or seems to be accessing) memory in a misaligned way on purpose.

4.2 Loops

The analysis of a source program always takes a finite time. The fact that the source code contains loops, and that some of these loops do not terminate, can never induce the analyzer itself to loop forever. In order to guarantee this property, the analyzer may need to introduce approximations when analyzing a loop.

Let us assume, in the following lines, that the function c is unknown:

```
n=100;
       i=0;
2
       y=0;
3
       do
4
5
         {
            i++;
6
            if (c(i))
7
              v = 2*i;
8
         }
9
       while (i<n);</pre>
10
```

The EVA plug-in could provide the best possible sets of values if the user explicitly instructed it to study step by step each of the hundred loop iterations. Without any such instruction, it analyses the body of the loop much less than one hundred times. It is able to provide the approximated, but correct, information that after the loop, y contains an even number between 0 and 256. This is an over-approximation of the most precise correct result, which is "an even number between 0 and 200". Section 5.3.1 introduces different ways for the user to influence the analyzer's strategy with respect to loops.

4.3 Functions

Without special instructions from the user, function calls are handled as if the body of the function had been expanded at the call site. In the following example, the body of f is analyzed again at each analysis of the body of the loop. The result of the analysis is as precise as the result obtained for the example in section 4.2.

```
int n, y;
1
    void f(int x) { y = x; }
2
3
    void main 1(void) {
4
       int i;
5
6
      n=100;
7
      i=0;
8
      y=0;
9
10
      do
         {
11
           i++;
12
           if (c(i))
13
             f(2*i);
14
         }
       while (i<n);</pre>
16
17
   }
18
```

Variadic function calls are not handled very precisely. On the other hand, many applications do not call any variadic function other than printf, and the observation primitives of Frama-C (section 8.3) and the capabilities built in the GUI more than make up for the absence of printf.

Recursive functions are allowed in Frama-C, but they are not handled in the current version of the EVA plug-in.

4.4 Analyzing a partial or a complete application

The default behavior of the EVA plug-in allows to analyze complete applications, that is, applications for which the source code is entirely available. In practice, it is sometimes desirable to limit the analysis to critical subparts of the application, by using other entry points than the actual one (the main function). Besides, the source code of some of the functions used by the application may not be available (library functions for instance). The plug-in can be used, usually with more work, in all these circumstances. The options for specifying the entry point of the analysis are detailed in this manual, section 5.3.2.

4.4.1 Entry point of a complete application

When the source code for the analyzed application is entirely available, the only additional information expected by the plug-in is the name of the function that the analysis should start from. Specifying the wrong entry point can lead to incorrect results. For instance, let us assume that the actual entry point for the example of section 4.3 is not the function main_1 but the following main_main function:

```
17 void main_main(void) {
18 f(15);
19 main_1();
20 }
```

If the user specifies the wrong entry point main_1, the plug-in will provide the same answer for variable y at the end of function f as in sections 4.2 and 4.3: the set of even numbers between 0 and 256. This set is not the expected answer if the actual entry point is the function main_main, because it does not contain the value 15.

The entry point of the analyzed application can be specified on the command line using the option -main (section 5.2.1). In the GUI, it is also possible to specify the name of the entry point at the time of launching EVA.

4.4.2 Entry point of an incomplete application

It is possible to analyze an application without starting from its actual entry point. This can be made necessary because the actual entry point is not available, for instance if the analysis is concerned with a library. It can also be a deliberate choice as part of a modular verification strategy. In this case, the option -lib-entry, described at section 5.2.3, should be used together with the option -main that sets the entry point of the analysis. In this mode, the plug-in does not assume that the global variables have kept their initial values (except for the variables with the const attribute).

4.4.3 Library functions

Another category of functions whose code may be missing is composed of the operating system primitives and functions from external libraries. These functions are called "library functions". The behavior of each library function can be specified through annotations (see chapter 7). The specification of a library function can in particular be provided in terms of modified variables, and of data dependencies between these variables and the inputs of the function (section 7.2). An alternative way to specify a library function is to write C code that models its behavior, so that its code is no longer missing from the point of view of the analyzer.

4.4.4 Choosing between complete and partial application mode

This section uses a small example to illustrate the pitfalls that should be considered when using EVA with an incomplete part of an application. This example is simplified but quite typical. This is the pattern followed by the complete application:

```
int ok1;
2
   void init1(void) {
3
4
      if (error condition)
5
        error_handling1();
6
7
      else
8
        ok1 = 1;
   }
9
10
   void init2(void) {
11
      if (ok1) { ... }
12
```

4.4. ANALYZING A PARTIAL OR A COMPLETE APPLICATION

```
13 }
14
15 void main(void) {
16 init1();
17 init2();
18 ...
19 }
```

If init2 is analyzed as the entry point of a complete application, or if the function init1 is accidentally omitted, then at the time of analyzing init2, EVA will have no reason to believe that the global variable ok1 has not kept its initial value 0. The analysis of init2 consists of determining that the value of the if condition is always false, and to ignore all the code that follows. Any possible run-time error in this function will therefore be missed by the analyzer. However, as long as the user is aware of these pitfalls, the analysis of incomplete sources can provide useful results. In this example, one way to analyze the function init2 is to use the option -lib-entry described in section 5.2.3.

It is also possible to use annotations to describe the state in which the analysis should be started as a precondition for the entry point function. The syntax and usage of preconditions is described in section 7.1. The user should pay attention to the intrinsic limitations in the way EVA interprets these properties (section 7.1.2). A simpler alternative for specifying an initial state is to build it using the non-deterministic primitives described in section 8.2.1.

Despite these limitations, when the specifications the user wishes to provide are simple enough to be interpreted by the plug-in, it becomes possible and useful to divide the application into several parts, and to study each part separately (by taking each part as an entry point, with the appropriate initial state). The division of the application into parts may follow the phases in the application's behavior (initialization followed by the permanent phase) or break it down into elementary sub-pieces, the same way unit tests do.

4.4.5 Applications relying on software interrupts

The current version of the EVA plug-in is not able to take into account interrupts (auxiliary function that can be executed at any time during the main computation). As things stand, the plug-in may give answers that do not reflect reality if interrupts play a role in the behavior of the analyzed application. There is preliminary support for using EVA in this context in the form of support for volatile variables.

Unlike normal variables, the analyzer does not assume that the value read from a volatile variable is identical to the last value written there. Instead, a volatile variable in which only scalar values have been written is assumed to contain [--..-] when it is read from, regardless of the precise value of the contents that were previously written. The values of volatile pointers (*i.e* variables containing pointers and with volatile specifier) are an imprecise form of the address that has previously been assigned to the pointer. Finally, the handling of (non-volatile) pointers to volatile locations is not finalized yet: it is not clear how the various complicated situations that can arise in this case should be handled. For instance, pointers to volatile locations may be pointing to locations that also have non-volatile access paths to them.

4.5 Conventions not specified by the ISO standard

EVA can provide useful information even for low-level programs that rely on non-portable C construct and that depend on the size of the word and the endianness of the target architecture.

4.5.1 The C standard and its practice

There exists constructs of the C language which the ISO standard does not specify, but which are compiled in the same way by almost every compiler for almost every architecture. For some of these constructs, the EVA plug-in assumes a reasonable compiler and target architecture. This design choice makes it possible to obtain more information about the behavior of the program than would be possible using only what is strictly guaranteed by the standard.

This stance is paradoxical for an analysis tool whose purpose is to compute only correct approximations of program behaviors. Then notion of "correctness" is necessarily relative to a definition of the semantics of the analyzed language. And, for the C language, the ISO standard is the only available definition.

However, an experienced C programmer has a certain mental model of the working habits of the compiler. This model has been acquired by experience, common sense, knowledge of the underlying architectural constraints, and sometimes perusal of the generated assembly code. Finally, the Application Binary Interface may constrain the compiler into using representations that are not mandated by the C standard (and which the programmer should not, a priori, have counted on). Since most compilers make equivalent choices, this model does not vary much from one programmer to the other. The set of practices admitted by the majority of C programmers composes a kind of informal, and unwritten, standard. For each C language construct that is not completely specified by the standard, there may exist an alternative, "portable" version. The portable version could be considered safer if the programmer did not know exactly how the non-portable version will be translated by eir compiler. But the portable version may produce a code which is significantly slower and/or bigger. In practice, the constraints imposed on embedded software often lead to choosing the non-portable version. This is why, as often as possible, EVA uses the same standard as the one used by programmers, the unwritten one. It is the experience gained on actual industrial software, during the development of early versions of Frama-C as well as during the development of other tools, that led to this choice.

The hypotheses discussed here have to do with the conversions between integers and pointers, pointer arithmetic, the representation of enum types and the relations between the addresses of the fields of a same struct. As a concrete example, EVA plug-in assumes two-complement representation, which the standard does not guarantee, and whose consequences can be seen when converting between signed and unsigned types or with signed arithmetic overflows. These parameters are all fixed with the -machdep option as described in section 5.2.6.

Often, the ISO standard does not provide enough guarantees to ensure that the behaviors of the compiler during the compilation of the auto-detection program and during the compilation of the application are the same. It is the additional constraint that the compiler should conform to a fixed ABI that ensures the reproducibility of compilation choices.

4.6 Memory model – Bases separation

This section introduces the abstract representation of the memory EVA relies on. It is necessary to have at least a superficial idea of this representation in order to interact with the plug-in.

4.6.1 Base address

The memory model used by EVA relies on the classical notion of "base address". Each variable, be it local or global, defines one and only one base address.

For instance, the definitions

1 int x; 2 int t[12][12][12]; 3 int *y;

define three base addresses, for x, t, and y respectively. The sub-arrays composing t share the same base address. The variable y defines a base address that corresponds to a memory location expected to contain an address. On the other hand, there is no base address for *y, even though dynamically, at a given time of the execution, it is possible to refer to the base address corresponding to the memory location pointed to by y.

4.6.2 Address

An address is represented as an offset (which is an integer) with respect to a base address. For instance, the addresses of the sub-arrays of the array t defined above are expressed as various offsets with respect to the same base address.

4.6.3 Bases separation

The strongest hypothesis that the plug-in relies on is about the representation of memory and can be expressed in this way: It is possible to pass from one address to another through the addition of an offset, if and only if the two addresses share the same base address.

This hypothesis is not true in the C language itself : addresses are represented with a finite number of bits, 32 for instance, and it is always possible to compute an offset to go from on address to a second one by considering them as integers and subtracting the first one from the second one. The plug-in generates all the alarms that ensure, if they are checked, that the analyzed code fits in this hypothesis. On the following example, it generates a proof obligation that means that "the comparison on line 8 is safe only if p is a valid address or if the base address of p is the same as that of &x".

```
int x, y;
int *p = &y;
void main(int c) {
    if (c)
    x = 2;
else {
    while (p != &x) p++;
```

CHAPTER 4. LIMITATIONS AND SPECIFICITIES

It is mandatory to check this proof obligation. When analyzing this example, the analysis infers that the loop never terminates (because p remains an offset version of the address of y and can never be equal to the address of x). It concludes that the only possible value for x at the end of function main is 2, but this answer is provided *proviso quod* the proof obligation is verified through other means. Some actual executions of this example could lead to a state where x contains 3 at the end of main: only the proof obligation generated by the plug-in and verified by the user allows to exclude these executions.

In practice, the hypothesis of base separation is unavoidable in order to analyze efficiently actual programs. For the programs that respect this hypothesis, the user should simply verify the generated proof obligations to ensure the correctness of the analysis. For the programs that voluntarily break this hypothesis, the plug-in produces proofs obligations that are impossible to lift: this kind of program cannot be analyzed with the EVA plug-in.

Here is an example of code that voluntarily breaks the base separation hypothesis. Below is the same function written in the way it should have been in order to be analyzable with Frama-C.

```
int x,y,z,t,u;
2
   void init non analyzable(void)
3
   ſ
4
      int *p;
5
6
      // initialize variables with 52
      for (p = \&x; p \le \&u; p++)
7
        *p = 52;
8
   }
9
10
   void init_analyzable(void)
11
   ł
12
13
          y = z = t = u = 52;
   }
14
```

4.6.4 Dynamic allocation

Dynamic allocation is modeled by creating new bases. Each call to malloc and realloc potentially creates a new base, depending on the *builtins* (described in section 8.1) used – possibly resulting in an unbounded number of such bases. Dynamically allocated bases behave mostly like statically allocated one, except that they come in two flavors:

- *strong* bases, allocated once per call to the allocation function, which are precise but may cause the analysis to diverge if they are called inside a loop. It is the responsibility of the user to ensure that strong bases are not allocated inside loops.
- *weak* bases, allocated once per callstack, which may confound information from multiple calls to the allocation function, overapproximating their contents. This results in a less precise analysis, but maintains soundness and ensures termination. This is the safe default approach for allocations which may be nested inside loops.

Details about how to create and use these bases are provided in section 8.1.1.

4.7 What EVA does not provide

Values that are valid even if something bad happens

EVA provides sets of possible values under the assumption that the alarms emitted during the analysis have been verified by the user (if necessary, using other techniques). If during an actual execution of the application, one of the assertions emitted by EVA is violated, values other than those predicted by EVA may happen. See also questions 2 and 3 in chapter 9.

Termination or reachability properties

Although EVA sometimes detects that a function does not terminate, it cannot be used to prove that a function terminates. Generally speaking, the fact that EVA provides non-empty sets of values for a specific statement in the application does not imply that this statement is reachable in a real execution. Currently, EVA is not designed to prove the termination of loops or similar liveness properties. For instance, the following program does not terminate:

```
1 int x, y = 50;
2 void main()
3 {
4 while(y<100)
5 y = y + (100 - y)/2;
6 x = y;
7 }
```

If this program is analyzed with the default options of EVA, the analysis finds that every time execution reaches the end of main, the value of x is in [100..127]. This does not mean that the function always terminates or even that it may sometimes terminate (it does neither). When EVA proposes an interval for x at a point P, it should always be interpreted as meaning that if P is reached, then at that time x is in the proposed interval, and not as implying that P is reached.

Propagation of the displayed states

The values available through the graphical and programmatic interfaces do not come from a single propagated state but from the union of several states that the analyzer may have propagated separately. As a consequence, it should not be assumed that the "state" displayed at a particular program point has been propagated. In the following example, EVA did not emit any alarm for the division at line 8. This means that the divisor was found never to be null during an actual execution starting from the entry point. The values displayed at the level of the comment should not be assumed to imply that (x - y) is never null for arbitrary values $x \in \{0; 1\}$ and $y \in \{0; 1\}$.

```
int x, y, z;
1
  main(int c){
2
3
4
  /* At this point EVA guarantees:
5
     x IN {0; 1}
6
     y IN {0; 1}; */
7
     z = 10 / (x - y);
8
9
  }
```

With the option -slevel described in section 5.3.1, the lines leading up to this situation may for instance have been:

Identically, the final states displayed by the batch version of Frama-C for each function are an union of all the states that reached the end of the function when it was called during the analysis. It should not be assumed that the state displayed for the end of a function \mathbf{f} is the state that was propagated back to a particular call point. The only guarantee is that the state that was propagated back to the call point is included in the one displayed for the end of the function.

The only way to be certain that EVA has propagated a specific state, and therefore guarantee the absence of run-time errors under the assumptions encoded in that state, is to build the intended state oneself, for instance with non-deterministic primitives (section 8.2.1). However, the intermediate results displayed in the GUI can and should be used for cross-checking that the state actually built looks like intended.

Chapter 5 Parameterizing the analysis

EVA is automatic but gives you a little bit of control. Just in case.

5.1 Command line

The parameters that determine Frama-C's behavior can be set through the command line. The command to use to launch the tool is:

frama-c-gui <options> <files>

Most parameters can also be set after the tool is launched, in the graphical interface.

The options understood by the EVA plug-in are described in this chapter. The files are the C files containing source code to analyze.

For advanced users and plug-in developers, there exists a "batch" version of Frama-C. The executable for the batch version is named frama-c (or frama-c.exe). All options of EVA work identically for the GUI and batch version of Frama-C.

The options documented in this manual can be listed, with short descriptions, from the command-line. Option -kernel-help lists options that affect all plug-ins. Option -value-help lists options specific to the EVA plug-in. The options -kernel-help and -value-help also list advanced options that are not documented in this manual.

Example:

```
frama-c -value-help
...
-slevel <n> superpose up to <n> states when unrolling control flow.
The larger n, the more precise and expensive the analysis
(defaults to 0)
...
```

The -val prefix found in most options is historical, and stems from the former name of EVA (namely, Value).

5.1.1 Analyzed files and preprocessing

The analyzed files should be syntactically correct C. The files that do not use the .i extension are automatically pre-processed. The preprocessing command used by default is gcc -C -E -I., but another preprocessor may be employed.

It is possible that files without a .c extension fail to pass this stage. It is notably the case with gcc, to which the option -x c should be passed in order to pre-process C files that do not have a .c extension.

The option -cpp-command <cmd> sets the preprocessing command to use. If the patterns %1 and %2 do not appear in the text of the command, Frama-C invokes the preprocessor in the following way:

<cmd> -o <outputfile> <inputfile>

In the cases where it is not possible to invoke the preprocessor with this syntax, it is possible to use the patterns %1 and %2 in the command's text as place-holders for the input file (respectively, the output file). Here are some examples of use of this option:

```
frama-c-gui -val -cpp-command 'gcc -C -E -I. -x c' file1.src file2.i
frama-c-gui -val -cpp-command 'gcc -C -E -I. -o %2 %1' file1.c file2.i
frama-c-gui -val -cpp-command 'copy %1 %2' file1.c file2.i
frama-c-gui -val -cpp-command 'cat %1 > %2' file1.c file2.i
frama-c-gui -val -cpp-command 'CL.exe /C /E %1 > %2' file1.c file2.i
```

5.1.2 Activating EVA

Option -val activates EVA. Sets of values for the program's variables at the end of each analyzed function are displayed on standard output.

Many functionalities provided by Frama-C rely on EVA's results. Activating one of these automatically activates EVA, without it being necessary to provide the -val option on the command-line. In this case, it should be kept in mind that all other options of EVA remain available for parameterization.

5.1.3 Saving the result of an analysis

The option -save s saves the state of the analyzer, after the requested computations have completed, in a file named s. The option -load s loads the state saved in file s back into memory for visualization or further computations.

Example :

```
frama-c -val -deps -out -save result file1.c file2.c
frama-c-gui -load result
```

5.1.4 Controlling the output

By default, EVA emits all the alarms it finds (section 3.2) as both ACSL assertions and textual messages in the log. For big analyses, the log can become quite large. Since ACSL assertions are stored by the Frama-C kernel, and can be output using plugins such as Report, the textual output is partly redundant. Thus, the textual emission of alarms can be inhibited using the combination of options -no-val-warn-on-alarms -value-msg-key=-alarm.

5.2 Describing the analysis context

5.2.1 Specification of the entry point

The option -main f specifies that f should be used as the entry point for the analysis. If this option is not specified, the analyzer uses the function called main as the entry point.

5.2.2 Analysis of a complete application

By default (when the option -lib-entry is *not* set), the analysis starts from a state in which initialized global variables contain their initial values, and uninitialized ones contain zero. This only makes sense if the entry point (see section 5.2.1) is the actual starting point of this analyzed application. In the initial state, each formal argument of the entry point contains a non-deterministic value that corresponds to its type. Representative locations are generated for arguments with a pointer type, and the value of the pointer argument is the union of the address of this location and of NULL. For chain-linked structures, these locations are allocated only up to a fixed depth.

Example: for an application written for the POSIX interface, the prototype of main is:

int main(int argc, char **argv)

The types of arguments argc and argv translate into the following initial values:

```
argc ∈ [--..-]
argv ∈ {{ NULL ; &S_argv[0] }}
__retres ∈ UNINITIALIZED
S_argv[0] ∈ {{ NULL ; &S_0_S_argv[0] }}
[1] ∈ {{ NULL ; &S_1_S_argv[0] }}
S_0_S_argv[0..1] ∈ [--..-]
S_1_S_argv[0..1] ∈ [--..-]
```

This is generally not what is wanted, but then again, embedded applications are generally not written against the POSIX interface. If the analyzed application expects command-line arguments, you should probably write an alternative entry point that creates the appropriate context before calling the actual entry point. That is, consider an example application whose source code looks like this:

```
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
    if (argc != 2) usage();
    ...
}
void usage(void)
```

```
printf("this application expects an argument between '0' and '9'\n");
exit(1);
}
```

Based on the informal specification provided in usage, you should make use of the nondeterministic primitives described in section 8.2.1 to write an alternative entry point for the analysis like this:

```
int analysis_main(void)
{
    char *argv[3];
    char arg[2];
    arg[0]=Frama_C_interval('0', '9');
    arg[1]=0;
    argv[0]="Analyzed application";
    argv[1]=arg;
    argv[2]=NULL;
    return main(2, argv);
}
```

For this particular example, the initial state that was automatically generated includes the desired one. This may however not always be the case. Even when it is the case, it is desirable write an analysis entry point that positions the values of argc and argv to improve the relevance of the alarms emitted by EVA.

Although the above method is recommended for a complete application, it remains possible to let the analysis automatically produce values for the arguments of the entry point. In this case, the options described in section 5.2.4 below can be used to tweak the generation of these values to some extent.

5.2.3 Analysis of an incomplete application

The option -lib-entry specifies that the analyzer should not use the initial values for globals (except for those qualified with the keyword const). With this option, the analysis starts with an initial state where the numerical components of global variables (without the const qualifier) and arguments of the entry point are initialized with a non-deterministic value of their respective type.

Global variables of pointer type contain the non-deterministic superposition of NULL and of the addresses of locations allocated by the analyzer. The algorithm to generate those is the same as for formal arguments of the entry point (see previous section). The same options can be used to parameterize the generation of the pointed locations (see next section).

5.2.4 Tweaking the automatic generation of initial values

This sections describes the options that influence the automatic generation of initial values of variables. The concerned variables are the arguments of the entry point and, in -lib-entry mode, the non-const global variables.

Width of the generated tree

For a variable of a pointer type, there is no way for the analyzer to guess whether the pointer should be assumed to be pointing to a single element or to be pointing at the beginning of an array — or indeed, in the middle of an array, which would mean that it is legal to take negative offsets of this pointer.

By default, a pointer type is assumed to point at the beginning of an array of two elements. This number can be changed with option -context-width.

Example: if the prototype for the entry point is void main(int *t), the analyzer assumes t points to an array int S_t[2].

For an array type, non-aliasing subtrees of values are generated for the first few cells of the array. All remaining cells are made to contain a non-deterministic superposition of the first ones. The number of initial cells for which non-aliasing subtrees are generated is also decided by the value of option -context-width.

Example: with the default value 2 for option -context-width, the declaration int *(t[5]); causes the following array to be allocated:

```
\begin{array}{l} t \in \{ \{ \text{ NULL }; \&S\_t[0] \} \} \\ & S\_t[0] \in \{ \{ \text{ NULL }; \&S\_0\_S\_t[0] \} \} \\ & [1] \in \{ \{ \text{ NULL }; \&S\_1\_S\_t[0] \} \} \\ & [2..4] \in \{ \{ \text{ NULL }; \&S\_0\_S\_t[0] ; \&S\_1\_S\_t[0] \} \} \\ & S\_0\_S\_t[0..1] \in [--..-] \\ & S\_1\_S\_t[0..1] \in [--..-] \end{array}
```

Note that for both arrays of pointers and pointers to pointers, using option -context-width 1 corresponds to a very strong assumption on the contents of the initial state with respect to aliasing. You should only use the argument 1 for option -context-width in special cases, and use at least 2 for generic, relatively representative calling contexts.

Depth of the generated tree

For variables of a type pointer to pointers, the analyzer limits the depth up to which initial chained structures are generated. This is necessary for recursive types such as follows.

```
struct S { int v; struct S *next; };
```

This limit may also be observed for non-recursive types if they are deep enough.

Option -context-depth allows to specify this limit. The default value is 2. This number is the depth at which additional variables named S_{\ldots} are allocated, so two is plenty for most programs.

For instance, here is the initial state displayed by EVA in -lib-entry mode if a global variable s has type struct S defined above:

```
s.v ∈ [--..-]
.next ∈ {{ NULL ; &S_next_s[0] }}
S_next_s[0].v ∈ [--..-]
[0].next ∈ {{ NULL ; &S_next_0_S_next_s[0] }}
[1].v ∈ [--..-]
[1].next ∈ {{ NULL ; &S_next_1_S_next_s[0] }}
S_next_0_S_next_s[0].v ∈ [--..-]
[0].next ∈
{{ garbled mix of &{
WELL_next_0_S_next_0_S_next_s}}
(origin: Well) }}
```

In this case, if variable s is the only one which is automatically allocated, it makes sense to set the option -context-width to one. The value of the option -context-depth represents the length of the linked list which is modeled with precision. After this depth, an imprecise value (called a well) captures all the possible continuations in a compact but imprecise form.

Below are the initial contents for a variable s of type struct S with options -context-width 1 -context-depth 1:

```
s.v ∈ [--..-]
.next ∈ {{ NULL ; &S_next_s[0] }}
S_next_s[0].v ∈ [--..-]
[0].next ∈ {{ NULL ; &S_next_0_S_next_s[0] }}
S_next_0_S_next_s[0].v ∈ [--..-]
[0].next ∈
{{ garbled mix of &{WELL_next_0_S_next_0_S_next_s}
(origin: Well) }}
WELL_next_0_S_next_0_S_next_s[bits 0 to ..] ∈
{{ garbled mix of &{WELL_next_0_S_next_0_S_next_s}
(origin: Well) }}
```

The possibility of invalid pointers

In all the examples above, NULL was one of the possible values for all pointers, and the linked list that was modeled ended with a well that imprecisely captured all continuations for the list. Also, the context-width parameter for the generated memory areas has to be understood as controlling the maximum width for which the analyzer assumes the pointed area may be valid. However, in order to assume as little as possible on the calling context for the function, the analyzer also considers the possibility that any part of the pointed area might *not* be valid. Thus, by default, any attempt to access such an area results in an alarm signaling that the access may have been invalid.¹

The option -context-valid-pointers causes those pointers to be assumed to be valid (and NULL therefore to be omitted from the possible values) at depths that are less than the context width. It also causes the list to end with a NULL value instead of a well.

When analyzed with options -context-width 1 -context-depth 1 -context-valid-pointers, a variable s of type struct S receives the following initial contents, modeling a chained list of length exactly 3:

```
s.v ∈ [--..-]
.next ∈ {{ &S_next_s[0] }}
S_next_s[0].v ∈ [--..-]
[0].next ∈ {{ &S_next_0_S_next_s[0] }}
S_next_0_S_next_s[0].v ∈ [--..-]
[0].next ∈ {0}
```

5.2.5 State of the IEEE 754 environment

The IEEE 754 standard specifies a number of functioning modes for the hardware that computes floating-point operations. These modes determine which arithmetic exceptions can be produced and rounding direction for operations that are not exact.

¹For technical reasons, this also means that it is not possible to reduce the values of those areas through user-provided assertions (section 7.1.2).

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At this time, obtaining an infinite or NaN as result of a floating-point operation is always treated as an unwanted error. Consequently, FPU modes related to arithmetic exceptions are irrelevant for the analysis.

EVA currently offers two models of the floating-point hardware's rounding mode. Depending on the program analyzed and the compiler used, one of the following situations may occur.

- 1. The compiler transforms floating-point computations as if floating-point addition or multiplication were associative, or transforms divisions into a multiplication by the inverse even when the inverse cannot be represented exactly as a floating-point number. This case is not supported by EVA.
- 2. The program uses only double and float floating-point types, does not change the default (nearest-even) floating-point rounding mode and is compiled with a compiler that neither generates fmadd instructions nor generates extended precision computations (historical x87 instruction set). It can be analyzed with the default modeling of floating-point rounding.
- 3. The program uses only double and float floating-point types, but either does not stay during the whole execution in the "nearest" floating-point rounding mode, or is compiled with a compiler that may silently insert fmadd instructions when only multiplications and additions appear in the source code, or are compiled for the x87 FPU. It can be analyzed correctly by using the -all-rounding-modes analysis option.

The **-all-rounding-modes** option forces the analyzer to take into account more behaviors. The results obtained may therefore seem less precise with this option. Still, the user must resist the temptation to analyze eir program without this option when ey is not in the conditions that allow it, because the analysis may then be incorrect (the analysis may fail to predict some behaviors of the analyzed program, and for instance fail to detect some possible run-time errors).

5.2.6 Setting compilation parameters

Using one of the pre-configured target platforms

The option -machdep *platform* sets a number of parameters for the low-level description of the target platform, including the *endianness* of the target and size of each C type. The option -machdep help provides a list of currently supported platforms. The default is $x86_32$, an IA-32 processor with what are roughly the default compilation choices of gcc.

Targeting a different platform

If your target platform is not listed, please contact the developers. An auto-detection program can be provided in order to check the hypotheses mentioned in section 4.5.1, as well as to detect the parameters of your platform. It comes under the form of a C program of a few lines, which should ideally be compiled with the same compiler as the one intended to compile the analyzed application. If this is not possible, the analysis can also be parameterized manually with the characteristics of the target architecture.

5.2.7 Parameterizing the modeling of the C language

The following options are more accurately described as pertaining to Frama-C's modeling of the C language than as a description of the target platform, but of course the distinction is not always clear-cut. The important thing to remember is that these options, like the previous one, are dangerous options that should be used, or omitted, carefully.

Valid absolute addresses in memory

By default, EVA assumes that the absolute addresses in memory are all invalid. This assumption can be too restrictive, because in some cases there exist a limited number of absolute addresses which are intended to be accessed by the analyzed program, for instance in order to communicate with hardware.

The option -absolute-valid-range m-M specifies that the only valid absolute addresses (for reading or writing) are those comprised between m and M inclusive. This option currently allows to specify only a single interval, although it could be improved to allow several intervals in a future version.

Overflow in array accesses

EVA assumes that when an array access occurs in the analyzed program, the intention is that the accessed address should be inside the array. If it can not determine that this is the case, it emits an out of bounds index alarm. This leads to an alarm on the following example:

```
1 int t[10][10];
2
3 int main() {
4 return t[0][12];
5 }
```

EVA assumes that writing t[0][...], the programmer intended the memory access to be inside t[0]. Consequently, it emits an alarm:

```
out-of-bound.c:4:[kernel] warning: accessing out of bounds index. assert 12 <
10;</pre>
```

The option -unsafe-arrays tells EVA to warn only if the address as computed using its modeling of pointer arithmetics is invalid. With the option, EVA does not warn about line 4 and assumes that the programmer was referring to the cell t[1][2].

The default behavior is stricter than necessary but often produces more readable and useful alarms. To reiterate, in this default behavior EVA gets hints from the syntactic shape of the program. Even in the default mode, it does not warn for the following code.

```
4 int *p=&t[0][12];
5 return *p;
6 }
```

Option -safe-arrays also has an effect on the evaluation of the ACSL construct "...". When t is a known array, t[..] is strictly equivalent to t[0..s-1], where s is the number of elements of t. Conversely, when option -unsafe-arrays is set, t[..] means t[$-\infty..+\infty$] – meaning that the location overlaps with neighbouring zones when t is inside an array or struct.

5.2.8 Dealing with library functions

When the EVA plug-in encounters a call to a library function, it may need to make assumptions about the effects of this call. The behavior of library functions can be described precisely by writing a contract for the function (chapter 7), especially using an assigns clause (section 7.2).

If no ACSL contract is provided for the function, the analysis uses the type of the function as its source of information for making informed assumptions. However, no guarantee is made that those assumptions over-approximate the real behavior of the function. The inferred contract should be verified carefully by the user.

5.3 Controlling approximations

Unlike options of section 5.2, which used wrongly may cause EVA to produce incorrect results, all the options in this section give the user control over the tradeoff between the quality of the results and the resources taken by the analyzer to provide them. The options described in this section can, so to speak, not be used wrongly. They may cause Frama-C to exhaust the available memory, to take a nearly infinite time, or, in the other direction, to produce results so imprecise that they are useless, but **never** to produce incorrect results.

5.3.1 Treatment of loops

Default treatment of loops

The default treatment of loops by the analyzer may produce results that are too approximate. Tuning the treatment of loops can improve precision.

When encountering a loop, the analyzer tries to compute a state that contains all the concrete states possible at run-time, including the initial concrete state just before entering the loop. This englobing state may be too imprecise by construction: typically, if the analyzed loop is initializing an array, the user does not expect to see the initial values of the array appear in the state computed by the analyzer. The solution in this case is to use one of the two unrolling options, as described in this section.

As compared to loop unrolling, the advantage of the computation by accumulation is that it generally requires less iterations than the number of iterations of the analyzed loop. The number of iterations does not need to be known (for instance, it allows to analyze a while loop with a complicated condition). In fact, this method can be used even if the termination of the loop is unclear. These advantages are obtained thanks to a technique of successive approximations. The approximations are applied individually to each memory location in the state. This technique is called "widening". Although the analyzer uses heuristics to figure out the best parameters in the widening process, it may (rarely) be appropriate to help it by providing it with the bounds that are likely to be reached, for a given variable modified inside a loop.

Stipulating bounds

The user may place an annotation //@widen_hints v, e_1, \ldots, e_m ; to indicate the analyzer should use preferably the values e_1, \ldots, e_m when widening the sets of values attached to variable v.

Example:

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```
int i,j;
2
   void main(void)
3
   Ł
4
     int n = 13;
5
     for (i=0; i<n; i++)
6
       /*@ widen hints i, 12, 13; */
\overline{7}
       j = 4 * i + 7;
8
   }
9
```

 e_1, \ldots, e_m (the hint *thresholds*) must evaluate to compilation-time constants. They may contain numeric expressions and reference preprocessor macros and const int variables. Note that several hints can be added to a single statement, as follows:

```
/*@ widen_hints x, 10, 20, 30;
widen_hints y, 5, 25; */
```

The user may also annotate a loop with //@ loop widen_hints v, e_1, \ldots, e_m ;, in which case v may reference loop iteration variables.

Adding label global before the variable name, as in //@ loop widen_hints global:n, e_1, \ldots, e_m ;, makes the annotation affect all loops in all functions, including those from other compilation units. It is useful for referencing variables in inner loops whose outer loop is defined in another file.

Finally, the user may replace the variable name with "all" (including the double quotes) to apply the widening hints to *all* variables.

Note that these annotations affect *all* statements in the function, including statements *preceding* the one where the annotation is inserted.

Dynamic widening hints

widen_hints annotations accept not only variables, but more generally *lvalues*, such as *p and a[i]->p. If the lvalue contains a dereference operator, then the widening hint is considered *dynamic*: it is applied to every base pointed to by the lvalue at the statement where the hint is applied. In other words, if the hint *p, 42 is inside a loop, and at each loop iteration *p may point to a new base, then each new base has 42 added to its widening thresholds.

Dynamic hints are automatically global; the global prefix must not be applied to them.

Deprecated: WIDEN_HINTS loop pragma

Note: this syntax has been deprecated in favor of the previous one and it is kept here only for reference.

The loop widen_hints annotation above has an obsoleted syntax: //@ loop pragma WIDEN_HINTS v_1, \ldots, v_n , e_1, \ldots, e_m ; which serves the same purpose but has a few differences:

- it is restricted to loop annotations;
- more than one variable (v_1, \ldots, v_n) can be specified in a single hint;
- if no variables are specified, it works as the special value "all", that is, all variables in the loop are affected;

• it does not accept the global label.

Example:

```
int i,j;
1
2
   void main(void)
3
   {
4
     int n = 13;
5
     /*@ loop pragma WIDEN HINTS i, 12, 13; */
6
     for (i=0; i<n; i++)
7
       j = 4 * i + 7;
8
9 }
```

Loop unrolling

There are two different options for forcing EVA to unroll the effects of the body of the loop, as many times as specified, in order to obtain a precise representation of the effects of the loop itself. If the number of iterations is sufficient, the analyzer is thus able to determine that each cell in the array is initialized, as opposed to the approximation techniques from the previous section.

Syntactic unrolling The option -ulevel n indicates that Frama-C should unroll the loops syntactically n times before starting any analysis. If the provided number n is larger than the number of iterations of the loop, then the loop is completely unrolled and the analysis will not observe any loop in that part of the code.

Providing a large value for n makes the analyzed code bigger: this may cause the analyzer to use more time and memory. This option can also make the code notably bigger in presence of nested loops (polynomially bigger in the depth of nested loops). A large value should therefore not be used in this case.

It is possible to control the syntactic unrolling for each loop in the analyzed code with the annotation //@ loop pragma UNROLL n;. The user should place this annotation in the source code, just before the loop. This annotation causes Frama-C's front-end to unroll the loop n times.

Semantic unrolling The option -slevel n indicates that the analyzer is allowed to separate, in each point of the analyzed code, up to n states from different execution paths before starting to compute the unions of said states. An effect of this option is that the states corresponding to the first, second,... iterations in the loop remain separated, as if the loop had been unrolled.

The number n to use depends on the nature of the control flow graph of the function to analyze. If the only control structure is a loop of m iterations, then -slevel m+1 allows to unroll the loop completely. The presence of other loops or of if -then-else constructs multiplies the number of paths a state may correspond to, and thus the number of states it is necessary to keep separated in order to unroll a loop completely. For instance, the nested simple loops in the following example require the option -slevel 55 in order to be completely unrolled:

```
1 int i,j,t[5][10];
2
3 void main(void)
4 {
```

```
5 for (i=0;i<5;i++)
6 for (j=0;j<10;j++)
7 t[i][j]=1;
8 }</pre>
```

When the loops are sufficiently unrolled, the result obtained for the contents of array t are the optimally precise:

 $t[0..4][0..9] \in \{1\}$

The number to pass the option -slevel is of the magnitude of the number of values for i (the 6 integers between 0 and 5) times the number of possible values for j (the 11 integers comprised between 0 and 10). If a value much lower than this is passed, the result of the initialization of array t will only be precise for the first cells. The option -slevel 28 gives for instance the following result for array t:

t{[0..1][0..9]; [2][0..5]} \in {1} {[2][6..9]; [3..4][0..9]} \in {0; 1}

In this result, the effects of the first iterations of the loops (for the whole of t[0], the whole of t[1] and the first half of t[2]) have been computed precisely. The effects on the rest of t were computed with approximations. Because of these approximations, the analyzer can not tell whether each of those cells contains 1 or its original value 0. The value proposed for the cells t[2][5] and following is imprecise but correct. The set {0; 1} does contain the actual value 1 of the cells.

The option -slevel-function f:n tells the analyzer to apply semantic unrolling level n to function f. This fine-tuning option allows to force the analyzer to invest time precisely analyzing functions that matter, for instance -slevel-function crucial_initialization:2000. Oppositely, options -slevel 100 -slevel-function trifle:0 can be used together to avoid squandering resources over irrelevant parts of the analyzed application. The -slevel-function option can be used several times to set the semantic unrolling level of several functions.

Loop invariants

A last technique, complementary to the unrolling ones above, consists in using the loop invariant construct of ACSL. Loop invariants describe some properties that hold at the beginning of each execution of a loop, as explained in the ACSL specification, §2.4.2. They can be used to gain precision when analyzing loops in the following way: when the analysis is about to widen the value of a variable, it intersects the widened domain with the one inferred through the loop invariant. Thus, the invariant can be used to limit the (possibly overly strong) approximation induced by the widening step.

```
#define N 10
2
   void main (int c)
3
4
   ſ
      int t[N+5];
5
      if (c >= 1 && c < N)
6
7
      ſ
8
        int *p=t;
        /*@ loop invariant p < &t[N-1]; */</pre>
9
        while (1)
10
        {
11
          *(++p) = 1;
12
```

5.3. CONTROLLING APPROXIMATIONS

```
13 if (p >= t+c)
14 break;
15 }
16 }
17 }
```

In the example above, without a loop invariant, the pointer p is determined to be in the range &t + [4..60],0%4. In C terms, this means that p points between &t[0] and &t[15], inclusive. In particular, the analysis is not able to prove that the access on line 9 is always valid.

Thanks to the loop invariant p < &t[N-1], the variable p is instead widened to the range &t[0]..&t[N-2]. This means that the access to t through p at line 7 occurs within bounds². Thus, this technique is complementary to the use of WIDEN_HINTS, which only accepts integers — hence not &t[N-1]. Compared to the use of -slevel or -ulevel, the technique above does not unroll the loop; thus the overall results are less precise, but the analysis can be faster.

Notice that, in the function above, a more precise loop invariant would be

5 /*@ loop invariant p < &t[c-1]; */

However, this annotation cannot be effectively used by EVA if the value for c is imprecise, which is the case in our example. As a consequence, the analysis cannot prove this improved invariant. We have effectively replaced an alarm, the possible out-of-bounds access at line 7, by an invariant, that remains to be proven.

5.3.2 Treatment of functions

Skipping the recording of the results of a function

When a function f is called many times, or, in presence of semantic unrolling, if f contains large/nested loops, significant time may be spent recording the values taken by the program's variables at each of f's statements. If the user knows that these values will not be useful later, ey can instruct EVA not to record these with the -no-results-function f option. The -no-results-function option can be used several times, to omit the results of several functions. The option -no-results can be used to omit all results. The time savings can be important, as in the following example.

```
int t[2000], i;
2
   void irrelevant_function(void)
3
   {
4
      for (i=0; i<2000; i++)
5
       t[i]=i;
6
   }
7
8
   int main()
9
10
   ſ
11
     irrelevant_function();
12
     /* now the important stuff: */
13
      return t[143];
14
   }
15
```

time frama-c -val nor.c -slevel 2001

²And more precisely between t[1] and t[9], since p is incremented before the affectation to *p.

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```
[value] Values at end of function irrelevant_function:
 36
        t[0] \in \{0\}
 37
         [1] \in \{1\}
 38
         [2] \in \{2\}
 39
         [1999] \in \{1999\}
2036
        i \in {2000}
2037
      [value] Values at end of function main:
2038
        t[0] \in \{0\}
2039
         [1] \in \{1\}
2040
         [2] \in \{2\}
2041
         [1999] \in \{1999\}
4038
        i ∈ {2000}
4039
        \_retres \in {143}
4040
4041
     user time: 2.86s
4042
```

Launched with option -slevel 2001 so that the value returned by main can be computed precisely, the analysis takes 3 seconds. Contrast with:

time frama-c -val nor.c -slevel 2001 -no-results-function irrelevant_function

```
[value] Values at end of function main:
 36
     Cannot filter: dumping raw memory (including unchanged variables)
 37
       t[0] \in \{0\}
 38
         [1] \in \{1\}
 39
        [2] \in \{2\}
 40
        [1999] \in \{1999\}
2037
       i ∈ {2000}
2038
       \_retres \in {143}
2039
2040
     user time: 0.42s
2041
```

When instructed, with option -no-results-function irrelevant_function, that the values for the function irrelevant_function do not need to be kept, EVA takes less than a second to produce its results. This shows that in the earlier analysis, most of the time was not spent in the analysis itself but in recording the values of irrelevant_function.

Note that the function irrelevant_function was analyzed with as much precision as before, and that the result for main is as precise as before. The recording of some results is omitted, but this does not cause any loss of precision *during* the analysis³. The results for irrelevant_function are, as expected, unavailable. The "outputs" of main (the "outputs" computation is described in chapter 6) cannot be computed, because they depend on the outputs of irrelevant_function, which require the values of that function to be computed. These outputs would automatically be used for displaying only the relevant variables if they were available. Instead, all the program's variables are displayed.

The meaning of option -no-results-function irrelevant_function is different from that of option -slevel-function irrelevant_function:0. In the case of the latter, values are computed with less precision for irrelevant_function but the computed values are kept in memory as usual. All derived analyses (such as outputs) are available, but the values

³The emission of run-time error alarms and the evaluation of user-provided ACSL properties are done during the analysis and are not influenced by the -no-results* options. If you make use of only these functionalities, then you can speed up the analysis with option -no-results without detrimental effects.

predicted by the analysis are less precise, because irrelevant_function has been analyzed less precisely.

Using the specification of a function instead of its body

In some cases, one can estimate that the analysis of a given function f takes too much time. This can be caused by a very complex function, or because f is called many times during the analysis. If the solutions of the previous section are not sufficient, a radical approach consists in replacing the entire body of the function by an ACSL contract, that describes its behavior. See for example section 7.2 for how to specify which values the function reads and writes.

Alternatively, one can leave the body of the function untouched, but still write a contract. Then it is possible to use the option -val-use-spec f. This instructs EVA to use the specification of f instead of its body each time a call to f is encountered. This is equivalent⁴ to deleting the body of f for EVA, but not for the other plug-ins of Frama-C, that may study the body of f on their own.

Notice that option -val-use-spec f loses some guarantees. In particular, the body of f is not studied at all by EVA. Neither are the functions that f calls, unless they are used by some other functions than f. Moreover, EVA does not attempt to check that f conforms to its specification. In particular, postconditions are marked as *unknown* with -val-use-spec, while they are *considered valid* for functions without body. It is the responsibility of the user to verify those facts, for example by studying f on its own in a generic context.

5.4 Analysis cutoff values

5.4.1 Cutoff between integer sets and integer intervals

Option -val-ilevel <n> is used to indicate the number of elements below which sets of integers should be precisely represented as sets. Above the user-set limit, the sets are represented as intervals with periodicity information, which can cause approximations.

Example:

```
1 #include "__fc_builtin.h"
2
3 int t[12] = {2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, 27, 29, 31};
4
5 int main()
6 {
7 return t[Frama_C_interval(0, 11)];
8 }
```

With the default limit of 8 elements for sets of integers, the analysis of the program shows a correct but approximated result:

```
[value] Values at end of function main:
Frama_C_entropy_source ∈ [--..-]
__retres ∈ [2..31]
```

Studying the program, the user may decide to improve the precision of the result by adding -val-ilevel 16 to the command line. The analysis result then becomes:

⁴Except for a few properties, as described in the next paragraph.

```
[value] Values at end of function main:
  Frama_C_entropy_source ∈ [--..-]
  __retres ∈ {2; 3; 5; 7; 11; 13; 17; 19; 23; 27; 29; 31}
```

5.5 Advanced analyses

Starting from Frama-C Silicon, new analysis *domains* are available to improve the precision on specific code constructs. Theses analyses are all experimental. We expect their exact perimeter to evolve from one Frama-C version to the other.

The currently implemented domains offer no option other than the one meant to activate them. They can (and probably should) be enabled at the beginning of the analysis. Their only downside is that they increase the analysis time.

Restrictions:

- the results of theses analyses cannot currently be viewed in the GUI;
- adding a new analysis may unfortunately change previous results in unpredictable ways, and new alarms may sometimes appear.⁵

5.5.1 Symbolic equalities

This analysis is experimental.

Activating option -eva-equality-domain instructs EVA to perform a special analysis that stores information about equalities found in the code. Those equalities may stem either from conditions (e.g. if (x == y+1)), or assignments y = x+2; Once an equality has been inferred, it will be used when one of the expressions involved occurs later in the program.

```
int y = x+1;
// the equality y == x + 1 is inferred
if (y <= 2) {
    // Thanks to the equality, x <= 1 is deduced
}
```

This domain should be activated by default. Indeed, the normalisation done by Frama-C for expressions with side-effects introduces temporary variables, for which the equality domain is useful to regain precision.

Currently, the analysis is partially inter-procedural. The information known in the caller is not propagated in the callee. On the other hand, the information inferred in the callee is propagated back to the caller. The abstract states inferred by the domain are displayed by the builtin Frama_C_dump_each, when option -value-msg-key d-eqs is enabled.

5.5.2 Reused left-values

This analysis is experimental.

Activating option -eva-symbolic-locations-domain instructs EVA to perform a special analysis for *reused left-values*.

 $^{^{5}}$ Adding now domains may reduce the convergence speed, and/or lead to more **-slevel** being consumed. Sometimes, those changes snowball into additional alarms.

```
int t[10];
extern unsigned int u[10];
//@ requires i < 10;
void main(unsigned int i) {
    if (u[i] < 8) {
        t[u[i]] = 2;
    }
}</pre>
```

On this code, EVA cannot represent precisely u[i], and "learns" nothing from the condition u[i] < 8. Hence, EVA emits an alarm on the line t[u[i]] = 2, as it cannot prove that u[i] is less than 10.

To allow learning information from such conditionals, the new analysis stores information especially for u[i] itself. This analysis is of course correct in presence of pointers, in particular when the left-value is written through an alias between two read accesses. All "compound" left-values such as u[i], *p or q->t[i].v are handled.

Currently, the analysis is intra-procedural. The information known in the caller is not propagated in the callee. The abstract states inferred by the domain are displayed by the builtin Frama_C_dump_each, when option -value-msg-key d-symblocs is enabled.

5.5.3 Gauges

This analysis is experimental.

Activating option -eva-gauges-domain instructs EVA to store relations between integer (or pointer) variables modified by a loop, and the number of elapsed loop iterations. It is based on the paper "The Gauge Domain: Scalable Analysis of Linear Inequality Invariants" [Ven12].

```
int y = 3;
int t[100];
int *p = &t[0];
for (int i=0; i<100; i++) {
  y += 2; // y == 2*i + 5 holds. In particular, y <= 203
  *p++ = i; // all accesses are in bound
}
```

This domain should be activated for programs in which finite loops increase multiple variables simultaneously, in an affine way. It is *not* useful if the loop is fully unrolled by syntactic or semantic means, or if the relation between variables is not affine (e.g. computing a square).

Currently, the analysis is intra-procedural only: no information flows from the caller to the callee, or in the reverse direction. The relations inferred can only involve variables that are:

- local to a function (e.g. not a global), and not static;
- scalar (not a field of a struct, or a cell in an array).

Beware that the analysis works better when arithmetic overflows are reported as an alarm. With the default options of Frama-C, this means that gauges can be inferred easily for *signed* variables, but less so for *unsigned* ones. Indeed, the affine relations inferred by the domain are no longer true once the variable exceeds e.g. INT_MAX and wraps. Code such as

```
unsigned int x = ...;
int y = ...;
while (--x > 0) {
   y++;
   [...]
}
```

cannot be analyzed precisely, because the relation between x and y is not affine.

The abstract states inferred by the domain are displayed by the builtin Frama_C_dump_each, when option -value-msg-key d-gauges is enabled.

5.5.4 Bitwise values

This analysis is experimental.

Activating option -eva-bitwise-domain instructs EVA to store bitwise information in complement to the usual, interval-based, information. This is mostly useful for programs that use bitwise operators: &, |, ^ and ~, especially with bit-masks constants. The following program is analyzed more precisely thanks to the bitwise domain (with -slevel 2).

```
int isTopBit(unsigned something)
{
    //@ assert something >= 0x80000000 || something < 0x80000000;
    unsigned topBitOnly = something & 0x80000000;
    something ^= topBitOnly;
    if (something & 0x80000000) // More precision on this conditional { ... }
}</pre>
```

The current analysis is fully inter-procedural. All variables (including aggregates and arrays) are handled. In some cases, the domain is able to infer precise information on the bits of a pointer address.

The abstract states inferred by the domain are displayed by the builtin Frama_C_dump_each, when option -value-msg-key d-bitwise is enabled. For conciseness, the domain tries not to track information which is redundant with the intervals-based domain. Hence, not all variables will be present in the output.

5.5.5 Binding to APRON

These bindings are proofs-of-concept.

EVA features a very experimental binding to the numerical domains of the APRON library [JM09]. Assuming Frama-C has been compiled with support for Apron, the corresponding options are:

```
-eva-apron-box : boxes/intervals
-eva-apron-oct : octagons
-eva-polka-equalities : linear equalities
-eva-polka-loose : loose polyhedra
-eva-polka-strict : strict polyhedra
```

The analysis is fully interprocedural. However, the binding is currently intended as a proofof-concept, and should probably be used on small examples—not on full-scale programs. In particular, the following restrictions apply to the current implementation:

- only integer variables are tracked (pointers, floating-point values, and array cells or aggregate fields are ignored);
- variables are *not* packed, which may result in a very large number of tracked variables. Since relational domains are usually costly (cubic complexity for octagons, exponential for polyhedra), this may result in very long analyses and/or massive memory usage.

The abstract states inferred by the domain are displayed by the builtin Frama_C_dump_each, when option -value-msg-key d-apron is enabled.

5.6 Non-termination

The parameterization of EVA can lead to situations where the analysis stops abruptly due to the absence of valid states. For instance, some primitives (section 8) may detect an invalid precondition and stop propagating the current callstack, or a loop may become infinite if the exit condition depends on invalid accesses.

The alarms generated in these situations may become *Unknown* if there are other callstacks for which the analysis succeeded. Therefore, during the initial part of an analysis, they may blend in with the sets of possibly false alarms. However, priority should be given to these alarms, since they are likely to indicate an incorrect parameterization.

To help identify these situations, the *Nonterm* plug-in has been developed. It runs after EVA, by adding -then -nonterm at the end of the command-line.

Nonterm emits warnings about non-terminating instructions in functions analyzed by EVA. It operates on a per-callstack basis, and therefore displays more precise results than a visual inspection on the GUI; in particular, if there are both terminating and non-terminating callstacks for a given statement, the GUI will not color their successors red (because of the terminating callstacks), but *Nonterm* will emit warnings for the non-terminating ones.

Nonterm only reports situations where EVA is able to guarantee non-termination. Because its purpose is to prioritize warnings that are likely to indicate parameterization errors, it does not consider callstacks where termination seems possible.

To avoid too much noise, you can use -nonterm-ignore f1,f2,f3,... to indicate functions that should not be reported by the plug-in; typically, exit, abort and similar functions that halt execution.

Also, option -nonterm-dead-code enables the emission of warnings related to syntactically unreachable code, e.g. instructions that are unreachable due to gotos or unconditional breaks. This can however generate a substantial amount of warnings and is rarely needed in practice.



Chapter 6 Inputs, outputs and dependencies

Frama-C can compute and display the inputs (memory locations read from), outputs (memory locations written to), and precise dependencies between outputs and inputs, for each function. These computations use EVA for resolving array indices and pointers.

6.1 Dependencies

An example of dependencies as obtained with the option -deps is as follows: y FROM x; z (and SELF)

This clause means that in this example, the variable y may have changed at the end of the function, and that the variables x and z are used in order to compute the new value of y. The text "(and SELF)" means that y might have been modified, and that if it had, its new value would only depend on x and z, whereas the absence of such a mention means that y has necessarily been overwritten.

The dependencies computed by -deps hold if and when the function terminates. The list of variables given for an output y contains all variables whose initial values can influence the final value of y.

Dependencies are illustrated in the following example:

```
int b,c,d,e;
1
2
   void loop_branch(int a)
3
4
   {
5
     if (a)
6
       b = c;
7
     else
       while (1) d = e;
8
9
   }
```

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The dependencies of function loop_branch are b FROM c, which means that when the function terminates, the variable b has been modified and its new value depends on c. The variables d and e do not appear in the dependencies of loop_branch because they are only used in branches that do not terminate. A function for which the analyzer is able to infer that it does not terminate has empty dependencies.

The set of variables that appear on the right-hand side of the dependencies of a function are called the "functional inputs" of this function. In the example below, the dependency of double_assign is a FROM c. The variable b is not a functional input because the final value of a depends only on c.

```
1 int a, b, c;
2
3 void double_assign(void)
4 {
5     a = b;
6     a = c;
7 }
```

The dependencies of a function may also be listed as NO EFFECTS. This means that the function has no effects when it terminates. There are various ways this can happen; in the example below, all three functions f, g and h get categorized as having no effects. Function f does it the intuitive way, by not having effects. Function g and h get categorized as not having effects in a more subtle way: the only executions of g that terminate have no effects. Function h never terminates at all, and neither *(char*)0 nor x and y need be counted as locations modified on termination.

```
int x, y;
 1
2
3
    void f(void)
    {
4
       0;
5
    }
6
7
    void g(int c)
8
    ſ
9
       if (c)
10
       {
11
         x = 1;
12
         while (x);
13
14
       }
    }
15
16
    void h(void)
17
    ł
18
19
       x = 1;
20
       y = 2;
       *(char*)0 = 3;
21
    }
22
```

6.2 Imperative inputs

The imperative inputs of a function are the locations that may be read during the execution of this function. The analyzer computes an over-approximation of the set of these locations with the option -input. For the function double_assign of the previous section, Frama-C offers b; c as imperative inputs, which is the exact answer.

A location is accounted for in the imperative inputs even if it is read only in a branch that does not terminate. When asked to compute the imperative inputs of the function loop_branch of the previous section, Frama-C answers c; e which is again the exact answer.

Variant -input omits function parameters from the displayed inputs.

Variant -input-with-formals leaves function parameters in the displayed inputs (if they indeed seem to be accessed in the function).

6.3 Imperative outputs

The imperative outputs of a function are the locations that may be written to during the execution of this function. The analyzer computes an over-approximation of this set with the option -out. For the function loop_branch from above, Frama-C provides the imperative outputs b; d which is the exact answer.

Variant -out includes local variables, and variant -out-external omits them.

6.4 Operational inputs

The name "operational inputs of a function" is given to the locations that are read without having been previously written to. These are provided in two flavors: a superset of locations that can be thus read in all terminating executions of the function, and a superset of the locations thus read including non-terminating executions.

Operational inputs can for instance be used to decide which variables to initialize in order to be able to execute the function. Both flavors of operational inputs are displayed with the option -inout, as well as a list of locations that are guaranteed to have been over-written when the function terminates; the latter is a by-product of the computation of operational inputs that someone may find useful someday.

```
int b, c, d, e, *p;
1
2
    void op(int a)
3
    {
 4
      a = *p;
5
      a = b;
6
      if (a)
7
        b = c;
8
9
      else
        while (1) d = e;
10
   }
11
```

This example, when analyzed with the options -inout -lib-entry -main op, is found to have on termination the operational inputs b; c; p; S_p[0] for function op. Operational inputs for non-terminating executions add e, which is read inside an infinite loop, to this list.

Variable p is among the operational inputs, although it is not a functional input, because it is read (in order to be dereferenced) without having been previously overwritten. The variable a is not among the operational inputs because its value has been overwritten before being read. This means that an actual execution of the function op requires to initialize p (which

CHAPTER 6. INPUTS, OUTPUTS AND DEPENDENCIES

influences the execution by causing, or not, an illicit memory access), whereas on the other hand, the analyzer guarantees that initializing **a** is unnecessary.

Chapter 7 Annotations

Frama-C's language for annotations is ACSL. Only a subset of the properties that can be expressed in ACSL can effectively be of service to or be checked by the EVA plug-in.

7.1 Preconditions, postconditions and assertions

7.1.1 Truth value of a property

Each time it encounters a precondition, postcondition or user assertion, the analyzer evaluates the truth value of the property in the state it is propagating. The result of this evaluation can be:

- valid, indicating that the property is verified for the current state;
- invalid, indicating that the property is certainly false for the current state;
- unknown, indicating that the imprecision of the current state and/or the complexity of the property do not allow to conclude in one way or the other.

If a property obtains the evaluation valid every time the analyzer goes through it, this means that the property is valid under the hypotheses made by the analyzer.

When a property evaluates to invalid for some passages of the analysis, it does not necessarily indicate a problem: the property is false only for the execution paths that the analyzer was considering these times. It is possible that these paths do not occur for any real execution. The fact that the analyzer is considering these paths may be a consequence of a previous approximation. However, if the property evaluates to invalid for *all* passages of the analysis, then the code at that point is either dead or always reached in a state that does not satisfy the property, and the program should be examined more closely.

The analysis log contains property statuses relative to the state currently propagated (this is to help the user understand the conditions in which the property fails to verify). The same property can appear several times in the log, for instance if its truth value is valid for some passages of EVA and invalid for others.¹

The graphical interface also displays a summary status for each property that encompasses the truth values that have been obtained during all of the analysis.

7.1.2 Reduction of the state by a property

After displaying its estimation of the truth value of a property P, the analyzer uses P to refine the propagated state. In other words, the analyzer relies on the fact that the user will establish the validity of P through other means, even if it itself is not able to ensure that the property P holds.

Let us consider for instance the following function.

```
int t[10],u[10];
1
2
   void f(int x)
3
   {
4
5
     int i;
     for (i=0; i<10; i++)
6
7
         //@ assert x >= 0 && x < 10;
8
         t[i] = u[x];
9
       }
10
11
   }
  frama-c -val -slevel 12 -lib-entry -main f reduction.c
```

EVA emits the following two warnings:

reduction.c:8: warning: Assertion got status unknown. reduction.c:8: warning: Assertion got status valid.

The first warning is emitted at the first iteration through the loop, with a state where it is not certain that x is in the interval [0..9]. The second warning is for the following iterations. For these iterations, the value of x is in the considered interval, because the property has been taken into account at the first iteration and the variable x has not been modified since. Similarly, there are no warnings for the memory access u[x] at line 9, because under the hypothesis of the assertion at line 8, this access may not cause a run-time error. The only property left to prove is therefore the assertion at line 8.

Case analysis

When using *semantic unrolling* (section 5.3.1), if an assertion is a disjunction, then the reduction of the state by the assertion may be computed independently for each disjunct. This multiplies the number of states to propagate in the same way that analyzing an if -then-else construct does. Again, the analyzer keeps the states separate only if the limit (the numerical value passed to option -slevel) has not been reached yet in that point of the program.

This treatment often improves the precision of the analysis. It can be used with tautological assertions to provide hints to the analyzer, as shown in the following example.

¹Conversely, as Frama-C's logging mechanism suppresses the printing of identical message, the property is printed only once with each status.

```
int main(void)
{
    int x = Frama_C_interval(-10, 10);
    //@ assert x <= 0 || x >= 0;
    return x * x;
    }
```

frama-c -val -slevel 2 .../share/builtin.c sq.c

The analysis finds the result of this computation to be in [0..100]. Without the option -slevel 2, or without the annotation on line 4, the result found is [-100..100]. Both are correct. The former is optimal considering the available information and the representation of large sets as intervals, whereas the latter is approximated.

Limitations

Attention should be paid to the following two limitations:

- a precondition or assertion only adds constraints to the state, i.e. always makes it smaller, not larger. In particular in the case of a precondition for a function analyzed with option -lib-entry, the precondition can only reduce the generic state that the analyzer would have used had there not been an annotation. It cannot make the state more general. For instance, it is not possible to use a precondition to add more aliasing in an initial state generated by option -lib-entry, because it would be a generalization, as opposed to a restriction;
- the interpretation of an ACSL formula by EVA may be approximated. The state effectively used after taking the annotation into account is a superset of the state described by the user. In the worst case (for instance if the formula is too complicated for the analyzer to exploit), this superset is the same as the original state. In this case, it appears as if the annotation is not taken into account at all.

The two functions below illustrate both of these limitations:

```
//@ requires a == &b || a == &c;
   int generalization(int *a, int b, int c)
2
   {
3
     b = 5;
4
     c = 4;
5
     *(int*)a = 3;
6
      return b;
7
   }
8
9
   //@ requires d != 0;
10
   int not_reduced(int d)
11
12
   {
      return d;
13
14
   }
```

If the analyzer is launched with options -lib-entry -main generalization, the initial state generated for the analysis of function generalization contains a pointer for the variable a in a separated memory region.

The precondition a == &b || a == &c will probably not have the effect expected by the user: the intention appears to be to generalize the initial state, which is not possible.

If the analyzer is launched with options -main not_reduced, the result for variable d is the same as if there was no precondition. The interval computed for the returned value, [--..-], seems not to take the precondition into account because the analyzer cannot represent the set of non-zero integers. The set of values computed by the analyzer remains correct, because it is a superset of the set of the value that can effectively happen at run-time with the precondition. When an annotation appears to be ignored for the reduction of the analyzer's state, it is not in a way that could lead to incorrect results.

7.1.3 An example: evaluating postconditions

To treat the postconditions of a function, the analysis proceeds as follows. Let us call B the memory state that precedes a call to a function f, and A the state before the post-conditions², *i.e* the union of the states on all return statements. Postconditions are evaluated in succession. Given a postcondition P, the analyzer computes the truth value \mathcal{V} of P in the state A. Then:

- If \mathcal{V} is valid, the analysis continues on the next postcondition, using state A.
- If \mathcal{V} is unknown, the postcondition may be invalid for some states $A_I \subset A$. The analyzer attempts to reduce A according to P, as explained in section 7.1.2. The resulting state A_V is used to evaluate the subsequent postconditions. Notice that P does not necessarily hold in A_V , as reduction is not guaranteed to be complete.
- if \mathcal{V} is invalid, the postcondition is invalid for all the real executions that are captured by B, and reducing by P leads to an empty set of values. Thus, further postconditions are skipped, and the analyzer assumes that the call did not terminate.

Notice that an invalid status can have three origins:

- \triangleright The postcondition is not correct, *i.e* it does not accurately reflect what the body of the function does. Either the postcondition or the body (or both!) can actually be incorrect with respect to what the code is intended to do.
- \triangleright The call to f never terminates, but the analyzer has not been able to deduce this fact, due to approximations. Thus, the postcondition is evaluated on states A that do not match any real execution.
- \triangleright The entire call actually never takes place on a real execution (at least for the states described by *B*). This is caused by an approximation in the statements that preceded the call to *f*.

In all three cases, \mathcal{V} is recorded by Frama-C's kernel, for further consolidation.

7.2 Assigns clauses

An assigns clause in the contract of a function indicate which variables may be modified by the function, and optionally the dependencies of the new values of these variables.

In the following example, the assigns clause indicates that the withdraw function does not modify any memory cell other than p->balance. Furthermore, the final value of p->balance has been computed only through its initial value and the value of the parameter s. The computation of p->balance *indirectly* requires reading p, as explained below.

 $^{^{2}}B$ and A stand respectively for *before* and *after*.

```
typedef struct { int balance; } purse;
typedef struct { int balance; } purse;
/*@ assigns p->balance \from p->balance, s, (indirect:p); */
void withdraw(purse *p,int s) {
    p->balance = p->balance - s;
}
```

Direct and indirect from clauses EVA makes use of specifications that are more precise than the ACSL language specifies in that it establishes a distinction between *direct* and *indirect* dependencies. A dependency is direct if the value contained in the dependency impacts the value of the lvalue referred to in the assign clause; a dependency is indirect if the value is used only in a conditional or to compute an address. Indirect dependencies are distinguished by an "indirect" label; other dependencies are direct. See for instance the valid ACSL contract below.

```
1 /*@ assigns *b \from a, (indirect:c), (indirect:b); */
2 void f_valid(int a, int *b, int c){
3 if (c) {
4     *b = a;
5     }
6     else
7     *b = 0;
8 }
```

An assigns clause can describe the behavior of functions whose source code is not part of the analysis project. This happens when the function is really not available (we call these "library functions") or if it was removed on purpose because it did something that was complicated and unimportant for the analysis at hand.

EVA uses the assigns clauses provided for library functions. It does not take advantage of the assigns clauses of functions whose implementation is also available, except when option -val-use-spec is used (section 5.3.2). The option -from-verify-assigns can be used to check the assigns clauses, when dependencies computation is also activated (section 6.1).

The effect of an assigns clause assigns loc from locD, (indirect:locI) on a memory state S are modelled by the analyzer as follows:

- 1. the contents of locD in S are evaluated into a value v;
- 2. v is generalized into a value v'. Roughly speaking, scalar values (integer or floating-point) are transformed into the set of all possible scalar values. Pointer values are transformed into pointers on the same memory base, but with a completely imprecise offset.
- 3. loc is evaluated into a set of locations L;
- 4. each location $l \in L$ of S is updated so that it contains the values present at l in S, but also v'. This reflects the fact that l may have been overwritten.
- 5. furthermore, if loc and locD are distinct locations in S, the locations in L are updated to contain *exactly* v'. Indeed, in this case, loc is necessarily overwritten.³

Notice that the values written in loc1 are *entirely* determined by locD and S. EVA does not attempt to "invent" generic values, and it is very important to write from clauses that are sufficiently broad to encompass all the real behaviors of the function.

 $^{^{3}\}mathrm{A}$ correct assigns clause for a function that either writes y into x, or leaves x unchanged, is assigns x \from y, x;.

Assigns clauses and derived analyses For the purposes of options -deps, -input, -out, and -inout, the assigns clauses provided for library functions are assumed to be accurate descriptions of what the function does. For the latter three options, there is a leap of faith in the reasoning: an assigns clause only specifies *functional* outputs and inputs. As an example, the contract assigns \nothing; can be verified for a function that reads global x to compute a new value for global y, before restoring y to its initial value. Looking only at the prototype and contract of such a function, one of the -input, -out, or -inout computation would mistakenly assume that it has empty inputs and outputs. If this is a problem for your intended use of these analyses, please contact the developers.

Postconditions of library functions When evaluating a function contract, EVA handles the evaluation of a postcondition in two different ways, depending on whether the function f being evaluated has a source body or just a specification.

- Functions with a body First, the body of f is evaluated, in the memory state that precedes the call. Then the analyzer evaluates the postconditions and computes their truth values, following the approach outlined in section 7.1.3. The memory state obtained after the evaluation of the body may also be reduced by the postconditions. After the evaluation of each property, its truth value for this call is printed on the analysis log.
- Functions with only a specification The analyzer evaluates the assigns \ldots \from \ldots clauses of f, as explained at the beginning of this section. This results in a memory state S that corresponds to the one after the analysis of the hypothetical body of f. Then, since postconditions cannot be proven correct without a body, they are *assumed* correct, and EVA does not compute their truth values. Accordingly, no truth value is output on the analysis log, except when we suspect the postcondition of being incorrect.

Although the analyzer does *not* use the postconditions to create the final memory state, it interprets them in order to *reduce*. Hence, it becomes possible to constrain a posteriori the very broad state S. A typical contract for a function successor⁴ would be

1 /*@ assigns \result \from x; 2 ensures \result == x + 1; */ 3 int succ(int x);

Note that postconditions are used solely to *reduce* S, but cannot be used to express the changes of a variable; thus it is very important to write assigns ... \from ... clauses that are correct (broad enough). Without them, the postcondition would apply on the initial values of the variable when the function is called, not on values produced by the function. For instance, forgetting to write the assign clause for p in function f would stop the evaluation (the postcondition of f is false if p is not assigned).

```
int y; int *p;
/*@ ensures p == &y; */
void f(void);
void main(void){ f(); }
```

Similarly, forgetting the from clause in the contract for g would stop the evaluation (without knowing where the value of p comes from, EVA assumes that it points to a constant address).

⁴Ignoring problems related to integer overflow.

```
int y; int *p;
/*@ assigns p \from q;
ensures p == &y; */
void g(int *q);
void main(void){ g(&y); }
```

A tricky example is the specification of a function that needs to return the address of a global variable.

```
1 int x;
2
3 void *addr_x(); // Returns (void*)&x;
```

The specification assigns \result from &x; is unfortunately incorrect, as from clauses can only contain lvalues. Instead, the following workaround can be used:

```
int x;
int x const __p_x = &x;
/*@ assigns \result \from __p_x;
ensures \result == &x; */
void *addr_x();
```



Chapter 8 Primitives

It is possible to interact with the analyzer through insertion in the analyzed code of calls to pre-defined functions.

There are three reasons to use primitive functions: emulating standard C library functions, transmitting analysis parameters to the plug-in, and observing results of the analysis that wouldn't otherwise be displayed.

8.1 Standard C library

The application under analysis may call functions such as malloc, strncpy, atan,... The source code for these functions is not necessarily available, as they are part of the system rather than of the application itself. In theory, it would be possible for the user to give a C implementation of these functions, but those implementations might prove difficult to analyze for the EVA plug-in. A more pragmatic solution is to use a primitive function of the analyzer for each standard library call that would model as precisely as possible the effects of the call.

Currently, the primitive functions available this way are all inspired from the POSIX interface. It would however be possible to model other system interfaces. Existing primitives are described in the rest of this section.

Builtins are enabled by default. The currently available builtins include some string functions (e.g. strlen and strnlen), some floating-point mathematical functions (e.g. sin and pow), and functions for dynamic memory allocation (malloc, calloc, realloc and free). The complete list of builtins for EVA (including builtins unrelated to the standard C library) is presented in section 8.4.

You can also manually specify each builtin to be used with option -val-builtin, which takes pairs of functions: the function to be replaced, and the name of the builtin that replaces it. For instance, option -val-builtin malloc:Frama_C_malloc_fresh,free:Frama_C_free enables

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builtins for the malloc and free functions of the standard library. Note that even if a builtin is specified this way, the function still needs to be declared to be used. Also, note that existing specifications and implementations are ignored for functions replaced with builtins. If you want EVA to use your own definition of a function such as strlen, for instance, you need to use option -no-val-builtins-auto. You can then manually enable -val-builtin for each builtin that you do wish to activate.

If you specify a non-existing builtin in the command line, the error message will list all available builtins in your Frama-C installation. You can also use option -val-builtins-list to obtain the list of function names mapped to builtins, as well as the list of all builtins.

8.1.1 malloc, calloc, realloc and free functions

Several builtins for modeling dynamic allocation are available in Frama-C. Different variants are provided to allow precise results when possible, and convergence (termination) when needed. Some differences between the *strong* and *weak* bases allocated by these builtins are explained in section 4.6.4.

C library function	Weak (always terminates)	Strong (more precise)	
malloc	Frama_C_malloc_by_stack	Frama_C_malloc_fresh	
calloc	Frama_C_calloc_by_stack	$Frama_C_calloc_fresh$	
realloc	$Frama_C_realloc$	Frama_C_realloc_multiple	
free	Frama_C_free		

Table 8.1: Frama-C builtins for dynamic allocation functions

Note that function free has a single builtin for both cases.

Generally speaking, the safest approach is to start with the builtins on the left (*weak*), to ensure that the analysis will terminate. If the results are imprecise, and the allocation function is not called inside a loop, then the strong variant may be tried. If you are mistaken, and the analysis starts diverging, it will print (by default) several messages of this form:

```
[value] allocating variable __malloc_main_142_2981
[value] allocating variable __malloc_main_142_2982
```

This indicates that new bases are being created. The analysis will then have to be manually interrupted. You will then need to either entirely unroll the loop (*e.g.* giving the analysis enough slevel), or use a weak variant.

By default, *weak* builtins are used, but usage of -val-builtin takes precedence over preexisting associations. Another possibility is to call e.g. Frama_C_malloc_fresh manually, for the allocations that are guaranteed to occur a finite number of times.

Multiple locations per callstack Option -val-mlevel (default 0) sets the maximum number of calls to malloc (and similar functions) per call stack for which the weak version of the builtins will return a precise fresh location. Afterwards, the locations will be reused to ensure termination of the analysis – but leading to spurious aliasing and possible imprecision. In other words, setting -val-mlevel N means that up to N + 1 different locations will be created for each call stack. This allows, for instance, loops with known bounds $\leq N$ to remain precise, while ensuring termination for other loops.

Memory allocation failure By default, the memory allocation builtins in EVA consider that the allocation may fail, thus NULL is always returned as a possible value. To change this behavior (supposing that these functions never fail), use option -no-val-malloc-returns-null.

8.2 Parameterizing the analysis

8.2.1 Adding non-determinism

The following functions, declared in share/libc/__fc_builtin.h, allow to introduce some nondeterminism in the analysis. The results given by EVA are valid for all values proposed by the user, as opposed to what a test-generation tool would typically do. A tool based on testing techniques would indeed necessarily pick only a subset of the billions of possible entries to execute the application.

```
int Frama_C_nondet(int a, int b);
    /* returns either a or b */
void *Frama_C_nondet_ptr(void *a, void *b);
    /* returns either a or b */
int Frama_C_interval(int min, int max);
    /* returns any value in the interval from min to max inclusive */
float Frama_C_float_interval(float min, float max);
    /* returns any value in the interval from min to max inclusive */
double Frama_C_double_interval(double min, double max);
    /* returns any value in the interval from min to max inclusive */
```

The implementation of these functions might change in future versions of Frama-C, but their types and their behavior will stay the same.

Example of use of the functions introducing non-determinism:

```
#include "share/builtin.h"
1
\mathbf{2}
3
   int A,B,X;
  void main(void)
4
5
  ſ
    A = Frama_C_nondet(6, 15);
6
    B = Frama_C_interval(-3, 10);
7
     X = A * B;
8
  }
9
```

With the command below, the obtained result for variable X is [-45..150], 0%3.

| frama-c -val -cpp-command "gcc -C -E -I.../share" ex_nondet.c .../share/builtin.c

Note that reads of volatile variables also return a non-deterministic value.

8.3 Observing intermediate results

In addition to using the graphical user interface, it is also possible to obtain information about the value of variables at a particular point of the program in log files. This is done by inserting at the relevant points in the source code calls to the functions described below.

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Currently, functions displaying intermediate results all have an immediate effect, *i.e* their effect is to display the state that the analyzer is propagating at the time it reaches the call. Thus, these functions might expose some undocumented aspects of the behavior of the analyzer. This is especially visible when they are used together with semantic unrolling (see section 5.3.1). Displayed results may be counter-intuitive to the user. It is recommended to attach a greater importance to the union of the values displayed during the whole analysis than to the particular order during which the subsets composing these unions are propagated by the analyzer.

8.3.1 Displaying the entire memory state

The current memory state each time the analyzer reaches a given point of the program can be displayed with a call to the function Frama_C_dump_each().

8.3.2 Displaying the value of an expression

Displaying the values of an expression expr each time the analyzer reaches a given point of the program is done with a call to the function Frama_C_show_each_name(expr).

The place-holder "name" can be replaced by an arbitrary identifier. This identifier will appear in the output of the analyzer along with the value of the argument. It is recommended to use different identifiers for each use of these functions, as shown in the following example:

```
void f(int x)
{
  int y;
 y = x;
 Frama C show each x(x);
 Frama_C_show_each_y(y);
 Frama_C_show_each_delta(y-x);
}
```

Table of builtins 8.4

This table briefly summarizes all builtins present in EVA, with a short description of their behavior.

8.4.1 **F**loating-point operations

Generally speaking, all functions mentioned below are the counter-part of the standard library function of the same name, minus the Frama_C_ prefix.

Floating-point builtins					
Frama_C_atan2	Frama_C_ceil	Frama_C_ceilf	Frama_C_cos	Frama_C_exp	
$Frama_C_expf$	Frama_C_floor	$Frama_C_fmod$	$Frama_C_log$	$Frama_C_logf$	
$Frama_C_log10$	$Frama_C_log10f$	Frama_C_pow	$Frama_C_powf$	$Frama_C_round$	
$Frama_C_roundf$	Frama_C_sqrt	Frama_C_sqrtf	$Frama_C_trunc$	$Frama_C_truncf$	

8.4.2 String operations

Builtins for functions of the string.h standard header.

String manipulation builtins Frama_C_memchr Frama_C_rawmemchr Frama_C_strchr Frama_C_strlen Frama_C_strnlen

Note: rawmemchr is a GNU extension to standard C.

8.4.3 Memory manipulation

Builtins for the C standard library functions memcpy and memset (respectively, Frama_C_memcpy and Frama_C_memset) exist, but they are not available in the open-source release of Frama-C. Please contact us if you would like to use them for academic and/or commercial purposes.

8.4.4 Dynamic allocation

These builtins are already described in section 4.6.4. They are listed here for completeness.

Dynamic memory allocation builtins					
Frama_C_alloc_by_stack	Frama_C_vla_alloc_by_stack	Frama_C_malloc_fresh			
Frama_C_calloc_by_stack	$Frama_C_calloc_fresh$	Frama_C_free			
Frama_C_realloc	Frama_C_realloc_multiple	Frama_C_vla_free			

Dynamic memory allocation builtins



Chapter 9

FAQ

Well, for some value of "frequently"...

Q.1 Which option should I use to improve the handling of loops in my program, -ulevel or -slevel?

The options -ulevel and -slevel have different sets of advantages and drawbacks. The main drawback of -ulevel is that it performs a syntactic modification of the analyzed source code, which may hamper its manipulation. On the other hand, syntactic unrolling, by explicitly separating iteration steps, allows to use the graphical user interface frama-c-gui to observe values or express properties for a specific iteration step of the loop.

The -slevel option does not allow to observe a specific iteration step of the loop. In fact, this option may even be a little confusing for the user when the program contains loops for which the analysis cannot decide easily the truth value of the condition, nested loops, or if-then-else statements¹. The main advantages of this option are that it leaves the source code unchanged and that it works with loops that are built using gotos instead of for or while. It also improves precision when evaluating if or switch conditionals. A current drawback of semantic unrolling is that it can only be specified crudely at the function level, whereas syntactic unrolling can be specified loop by loop.

Q.2 Alarms that occur after a true alarm in the analyzed code are not detected. Is that normal? May I give some information to the tool so that it detects those alarms?

The answers to these questions are "yes" and "yes". Consider the following example:

int x,y;

¹if-then-else statements are "unrolled" in a manner similar to loops

```
2 void main(void)
3 {
4     int *p=NULL;
5     x = *p;
6     y = x / 0;
7 }
```

When analyzing this example, EVA does not emit an alarm on line 6. This is perfectly correct, since no error occurs at run time on line 6. In fact, line 6 is not reached at all, since execution stops at line 5 when attempting to dereference the NULL pointer. It is unreasonable to expect Frama-C to perform a choice over what may happen after dereferencing NULL. It is possible to give some new information to the tool so that analysis can continue after a true alarm. This technique is called debugging. Once the issue has been corrected in the source code under analysis — more precisely, once the user has convinced emself that there is no problem at this point in the source code — it becomes possible to trust the alarms that occur after the given point, or the absence thereof (see next question).

Q.3 Can I trust the alarms (or the absence of alarms) that occur after a false alarm in the analyzed code? May I give some information to the tool so that it detects these alarms?

The answers to these questions are respectively "yes" and "there is nothing special to do". If an alarm might be spurious, EVA automatically goes on. If the alarm is really a false alarm, the result given in the rest of the analysis can be considered with the same level of trust than if Frama-C had not displayed the false alarm. One should however keep in mind that this applies only in the case of a false alarm. Deciding whether the first alarm is a true or a false one is the responsibility of the user. This situation happens in the following example:

```
int x,y,z,r,i,t[101]={1,2,3};
2
3
   void main(void)
4
   ſ
     x = Frama_C_interval(-10,10);
5
     i = x * x;
6
7
       = t[i];
8
     r = 7 / (y + 1);
9
     z = 3 / y;
10
   }
```

Analyzing this example with the default options produces:

On line 7, the tool is only capable of detecting that i lies in the interval -100..100, which is approximated but correct. The alarm on line 7 is false, because the values that i can take at run-time lie in fact in the interval 0..100. As it proceeds with the analysis, the plug-in detects that line 8 is safe, and that there is an alarm on line 9. These results must be interpreted thus: assuming that the array access on line 7 was legitimate, then line 8 is safe, and there is a threat on line 9. As a consequence, if the user can convince emself that the threat on line 7 is false, ey can trust these results (*i.e.* there is nothing to worry about on line 8, but line 9 needs further investigation).

Q.4 In my annotations, macros are not pre-processed. What should I do?

The annotations being contained inside C comments, they *a priori* aren't affected by the preprocessing. It is possible to instruct Frama-C to launch the preprocessing on annotations with the option -pp-annot (activated by default). Note that this option requires the preprocessor to be GNU cpp, the GCC preprocessor².

A typical example is as follows.

array.c

```
#define N 12
1
2
   int t[12];
3
4
   /*@ ensures 0 <= \result < N ; */
5
   int get_index(void);
6
7
   main()
8
   Ł
9
      int i = get_index();
10
      t[i] = 3;
11
12
   }
```

It is useful to use the pre-processor constant N in the post-condition of function get_index(). Use the command-line:

frama-c -val array.c -pp-annot

Note that when using this option, the preprocessing is made in two passes (the first pass operating on the code only, and the second operating on the annotations only). For this reason, the options passed to -cpp-command in this case should only be commands that can be applied several times without ill side-effects. For instance, the -include option to cpp is a command-line equivalent of the #include directive. If it was passed to cpp-command while the preprocessing of annotations is being used, the corresponding header file would be included twice. The Frama-C option -cpp-extra-args <args> allows to pass <args> at the end of the command for the first pass of the preprocessing.

Example: In order to force gcc to include the header mylib.h and to pre-process the annotations, the following command-line should be used:

```
frama-c-gui -val -cpp-command 'gcc -C -E -I.' \
    -cpp-extra-args '-include mylib.h' \
    -pp-annot file1.c
```

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²More precisely, the preprocessor must understand the -dD and the -P options that outputs macros definitions along with the pre-processed code and inhibits the generation of **#line** directives respectively.

CHAPTER 9. FAQ

text, I find awful, awkward constructs in it each time a new Frama-C release warrants a new pass on it. On the plus side, I am usually happy with it for a few days after each release, until I notice another blunder was left in. Do not hesitate to report documentation bugs at http://bts.frama-c.com/main_page.php.

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