

Reimplement? Reuse? Both!


Trustworthy Systems with Genode and SPARK

Alexander Senier
Sound Static Analysis for Security Workshop
Gaithersburg, MD, June 27th, 2018

About Componolit



- **Security company** based in Dresden, Germany
- Enable customers to build secure & robust systems
 - Component-based systems
 - Program verification
- **Focus:**
 - Mobile devices
 - Industrial IoT



What is SPARK?

Language and toolset

- Programming language and tool set
- Different levels of assurance
- Adapt at your discretion

What is SPARK?

Stone level

- No side-effects in functions
- No parameter aliasing
- No pointers
- Fewer dangerous constructs



What is SPARK?

Higher assurance

- **Bronze level:** Correct initialization and data flow
- **Silver level:** Absence of runtime errors
- **Gold level:** Proof key (integrity) properties
- **Platinum level:** Functional correctness


What is SPARK?

You may know this: Jet engines



What is SPARK?

And this: Vermont Lunar CubeSat



What is SPARK?
And this: Tokeneer



What is SPARK? And this: Muen Separation Kernel



© William Christen

What is SPARK?
But how about this?



SPARK
for the Web!

Demo #1

Plain Web application




Web application Security

- No authentication – bad idea!
- Options
 - Passwords
 - Client certificates
 - Authentication tokens

Web application Token-based authentication


```
eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIiwibmFtZSI6IkpvaG4gRG9lIiwiaWF0IjoxNTE2MzkwMjQyLmZlcnR5LmFkbWw5c
```

```
{  
  "alg": "HS256",  
  "typ": "JWT"  
}  
  
{  
  "sub": "1234567890",  
  "name": "John Doe",  
  "iat": 1516239022  
}
```



Token-based authentication

The monolithic approach



- A lot to trust!
- How likely is **no** critical bug within decades?
- Millions of lines of code
- Formally verifying all those components? Good luck!


**We still want trustworthy authentication for our wind turbine!
Alternatives?**

Interlude

The Genode OS Framework*

- **Recursive system structure**
 - Root: Microkernel
 - Parent: Responsibility + control
 - Isolation is default
 - Strict communication policy
- **Everything is a user-process**
 - Application
 - File systems
 - Drivers, Network stacks

■ Hierarchical System Architecture




Interlude

Minimal Trusted Computing Base

- **Trusted Computing Base (TCB)**
 - Software required for security
 - Parents in tree
 - Services used
- **TCB reduction**
 - Application-specific
 - Example: File system
- **Sessions**

■ Per-application TCB




Architecture for Trustworthy Systems

Strategy #1: Policy Objects

- Can't reimplement everything
- **Solution: software reuse**
 - Untrusted software (gray)
 - Policy object (green)
 - Client software (orange)
- **Policy object**
 - Establishes assumptions of client
 - Sanitizes
 - Enforces additional policies

■ Policy objects




Architecture for Trustworthy Systems

Strategy #2: Trusted Wrappers

- **Untrusted software (gray)**
 - E.g. disk, file system, cloud
- **Trusted wrapper**
 - Mandatory encryption
- **Client software (orange)**
 - No direct interaction with untrusted components
 - Minimal attack surface

■ Trusted wrapper




Architecture for Trustworthy Systems

Strategy #3: Transient components

- **Untrusted software**
 - E.g. Media decoder
 - No chance to get this right!
- **Transient component**
 - Temporarily instantiate untrusted software for single file/stream
 - Expose only simple interfaces (e.g. PCM audio)
 - Cleanup on completion


■ Transient component



Let's put it together.


Token-based authentication

First component-based attempt



Token-based authentication

Second component-based attempt



Demo #2

Minimal JWT Validator



© Gustavo Quepón

Component-based architecture

Disclaimer

- Never show your authentication tokens in presentations ;-)
- Proof-of-Concept
 - No TLS in this demo!
 - Only symmetric crypto for validating JWTs for now (HMAC-SHA256)
 - Only “stone” level right now (proving absence of runtime errors TBD)
- Not a solution for availability!

Component-based architecture

Trusted computing base

- The **TLS validator** has **3618 SLOC***:
 - Ada: 2836 (78.39%)
 - Cpp: 782 (21.61%)
- The **overall** Trusted Computing Base is **~37000 SLOC***:
 - Components: validator, microkernel, core, init, dynamic linker, RTC driver
 - cpp: 33318 (91.27%)
 - ada: 2836 (7.77%)
 - asm: 352 (0.96%)

***) generated using 'SLOCCount' by David A. Wheeler.**

Component-based architecture But, performance?



Performance Evaluation Setup

■ Client

- Intel Core i5-M520, 2.4 GHz
- Intel 82577LM GiB Ethernet
- Debian 9.4, x86_64
- Lighttpd 1.4.45-1



■ ab (Apache Benchmark)

- version 2.4.25-3+deb9u4
- 6 concurrent requests
- 1000 requests
1k, 10k, 100k, 1M

■ Evaluation Setup

1. Internet
2. Local webserver
3. Local webserver through **passthrough** JWT validator
4. Local webserver through **real** JWT validator

Performance Evaluation Results



Mean latency between request [ms]

Component-based architecture

Reimplement? Reuse? Both!

- Component-based systems and program verification fit together very well!
- **Confidentiality & integrity**
 - No need to verify large code bases
 - Reuse of large parts of the architecture
 - Minimal trusted computing base
 - Performance: Promising, but needs evaluation in realistic setup

Component-based architecture

What else?

- Everything you saw is open source – try it!
- **JWX library for parsing JWTs (and more)**
 - <https://github.com/Componolit/jwx>
- **Demo**
 - `examples/authproxy.adb` (in JWT repository)
- **Libsparkcrypto**
 - <https://github.com/Componolit/libsparkcrypto>
- **Genode OS Framework**
 - <https://github.com/genodelabs/genode>
- **SPARK**
 - <https://www.adacore.com/download>

Questions?



Alexander Senier
Managing Director
senier@componolit.com

@Componolit · componolit.com · github.com/Componolit