

# PROOF AND TEST WITH RICH SPARK 2014 CONTRACTS

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- 2 The system developed
- **3** Use of contracts during development
- 4 Use of contracts during static verification
- **5** Use of contracts during testing
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### THE APPROACH USED

- This project was our first use of SPARK 2014
- Previous use of SPARK 2005 and earlier
  - Usually proof of absence of run-time exceptions
  - > Contracts provided to support that
- Planned approach for project utilising new capabilities in SPARK 2014
  - > Combination of light and heavyweight contracts
  - > Combination of proof and test





Implementation Guidance for the Adoption of SPARK, AdaCore and Thales <u>https://www.adacore.com/books/implementation-guidance-spark</u>

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### THE SYSTEM DEVELOPED

- Embedded protection sub-system
  - Monitors operation of a wider system and overrides behaviour if required to maintain safety
  - > Developed to highest integrity under UK DEF STAN 00-56



### **USE OF CONTRACTS DURING DEVELOPMENT – OVERVIEW**



### **USE OF CONTRACTS DURING DEVELOPMENT – SCADE REQS**





### USE OF CONTRACTS DURING DEVELOPMENT – SCADE REQS Package specification:



package Operator 1 type SM 1 T is (State 1, State 2); type State T is record : Base Types.Float64; Local 1 Local 2 : Base Types.Float64; Operator 2 1 State : Operator 2. State T; : SM 1 T; SM 1 Init 1 Evaluated : Boolean; Operator 3 1 State : Operator 3.State T; end record: type Result T is record State : State T;

Output\_1 : Boolean; end record;











### **USE OF CONTRACTS DURING DEVELOPMENT – SCADE REQS**



Result.State.Local\_1 := (if (Result.State.SM\_1 = State\_1) then (if ((Old\_State.SM\_1 = State\_1) and Old\_State.Init\_1\_Evaluated) then Old\_State.Local\_1 else 0.0) else (Input\_1 \* Constants.Constant\_1));











### **USE OF CONTRACTS DURING DEVELOPMENT – ENGLISH REQS**

- Not all requirements amenable to specification in SCADE e.g.
  - Interface requirements (implemented in abstraction layers of low-level software and hardware)
  - Non-functional requirements (implemented in software and hardware architecture)
- Reverted to our previous style of proof of absence of run-time exceptions, with contracts necessary to support that
- Additional built-in checks added for testing but not proof
  - We didn't prove these because we felt run-time checks were more appropriate than static analysis
  - When interfacing with hardware there is a lot more that can go wrong and there are less solid assumptions on which to base static analysis

# **USE OF CONTRACTS DURING STATIC VERIFICATION**

- Proof of implementations against SPARK contracts matching SCADE and of absence of run-time exceptions in all code
- Challenges:
  - > Modifications required to SPARK derived from SCADE to support proof
    - Mainly addition of type bounds to types, which was lacking from SCADE
    - We addressed this by manually adding these to the SPARK
  - > Management of unproved VCs
    - We didn't prove 100% of the VCs
    - Engineers made reasonable efforts to prove during development
    - Proof experts worked on reducing these further periodically
    - Static verification report written for releases including rigorous argument for unproved VCs, which was reviewed

![](_page_18_Figure_11.jpeg)

### **USE OF CONTRACTS DURING TESTING – ENABLE ASSERTIONS**

- We enabled run-time assertion checks, even proved ones
- This was because:
  - > Actually, not all VCs are proved (some are justified)
  - > It allows us to check the assumptions on which the static analysis is based e.g. no hardware or compiler faults
  - > We can take some credit for these in the safety argument
- Run-time cost of checking contracts increases exponentially with call hierarchy
  - Execution time with all run-time checks enabled was over 100 times original
  - Reduced to around 2.5 times original by disabling higher level run-time contract checks

![](_page_19_Figure_9.jpeg)

All assertion checks

No high-level assertion checks

![](_page_19_Picture_12.jpeg)

# **USE OF CONTRACTS DURING TESTING – DEV MODULE TESTING**

- If have built-in assertion checks that capture what you're interested in, all you need to do is generate inputs for tests
- We used a mixture of input generation schemes
- Random input generation
  - Used during production of prototype of system to verify a critical module, in which no defects were ever found
- Cross-product of interesting input values
  - > Simple but powerful technique when have assertions
  - > E.g. 80,402 interesting input combinations with 1 failure
- Stopped developer testing of proved modules because no c defects found

![](_page_20_Figure_9.jpeg)

Param1

Param<sub>2</sub>

![](_page_20_Figure_10.jpeg)

Cross-product of interesting input values

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### **USE OF CONTRACTS DURING TESTING – IV&V SYSTEM TESTING**

- Independent verification and validation team used a constrained random input generation scheme together with a reference model
- No code faults found in code derived from SCADE requirements
  - > We did have some requirements faults, but not many
- There were considerably more requirements and code faults from English requirements
  - > The causes typically involved ambiguity in some way
- Where faults in code derived from English requirements were caught by built-in check failures, the faults were much easier to find
  - It was otherwise difficult to debug failures found by the randomly generated tests

## **USE OF CONTRACTS DURING TESTING – PROVED CHECKS FAIL**

- After an update, various proved postconditions started randomly failing
- The cause was found to be a low-level software fault
  - > Register values were being saved before interrupt handlers
  - > The registers were 64-bits but only 32-bits were typically used and boot loader was only preserving 32-bits on an interrupt
  - > When we used 64-bit floating point operations within interrupt handlers for the first time, if the interrupt handler interrupted a floating point operation then the top 32-bits of the registers could be corrupted
- This showed the ability of run-time assertion checks to catch wider system issues

![](_page_22_Picture_7.jpeg)

Interrupt using 32-bit ops

![](_page_22_Figure_9.jpeg)

Interrupt using 64-bit ops

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# CONCLUSIONS

- Approach combining heavyweight and lightweight SPARK 2014 contracts and proof and test was usable at highest integrity level
- SPARK contracts can be a good intermediate form in code generation
- Assertions can be effective at finding bugs, even if not proved, when combined with simple test input generation schemes
- Proof works! no code errors found where full contracts proved
- Formal spec works! much fewer errors for SCADE than English reqs
- Run-time assertions can help debug failures, particularly in gen. tests
- Enabling of run-time assertion checks worth considering even if proved because can take credit for them and they can find real issues

![](_page_23_Picture_8.jpeg)

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![](_page_23_Picture_10.jpeg)

![](_page_24_Picture_0.jpeg)

![](_page_24_Picture_1.jpeg)