



Software Analyzers

SPECIFICATION AND VERIFICATION OF HIGH-LEVEL PROPERTIES

FRAMA-C DAYS

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C Code

```

1 | int main() {
2 |     status res = OK;
3 |     while(res==OK) {
4 |         get_input();
5 |         res = update_state();
6 |     }
7 |     return res;
8 | }

```



- ✓ No runtime error
- ✓ Property 1
- ✓ Property 2
- ✓ ...

How do we specify properties?

ACSL

Position of the problem

- > Frama-C verifies that the code is conforming to its specification.
- > How confident can we be that annotations are really what we want to express?
- > In particular if they are big/numerous
 - > Example from Thales¹ (see next talk): ~400kLoC of ACSL annotations (from ~500 lines of MetAcsl).
- > And/or if we need to encode part of the property with ghost code.

¹Djoudi et al. Formal verification of a JavaCard virtual machine with Frama-C. FM 2021

What ACSL is good at

- > Expressing a property that (should) hold at a specific program point
- > or pre- and post- states for a contract
- > or a few more within the same function with `\at`

More complex situations

- > Check a property at a large number of program points: MetAcsI plug-in
- > Compare several executions of a function/some functions: Rpp plug-in
- > Check a sequence of events across the whole execution path: Aoraï plug-in

- > Developed by Virgile Robles during his PhD.
- > High-Level ACSL REquirement.
- > Properties that must be verified at various program points (**context**).
- > Meta-variables depending on the context.
- > Each HILARE is instantiated as (many) ACSL annotations.

```

1 meta \prop,
2   \name(region_integrity_task),
3   \targets( \diff( \ALL, init ) ),
4   \context(\writing),
5   \forall integer i; 0 <= i < NUM_REGIONS
6     \overlaps(\written,
7               RegionStart[i] +
8               (0 .. RegionSize[i] - 1))
9     ==> RegionOwner[i] == CurTask;
10
11 meta \prop,
12   \name(region_owners_final),
13   \targets( \ALL ),
14   \context(\writing),
15   \separated(\written,
16             RegionOwner + (0 .. NUM_REGIONS - 1));

```

```

1  int x, y;
2  /*@ assigns x \from n; */
3  extern void set_x(int n);
4
5  /*@
6  meta \prop, \name(example),
7  \targets(\diff(\ALL, set_x)),
8  \context(\writing),
9  \separated(\written, &x);
10 */
11
12 void test(int* p) {
13     *p = 1;
14     y = 2;
15 }

```

```
frama-c -meta meta_test.c
```

```

1  void test(int *p)
2  {
3      /*@ assert example: meta:
4          \separated(p, &x); */
5      *p = 1;
6      y = 2;
7      return;
8  }

```

> Some (trivial) simplifications are done

Use standard analysis plug-ins

```
frama-c -meta meta_test.c -then-last -wp
```

- > can also work with Eva or E-ACSL
- > Wp may require additional annotations
- > Some of which might come from other HILAREs

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Reasoning at Meta-level

- > a few deduction patterns to prove an HILARE from other ones
- > Why3 model
- > Prolog deduction engine

- > Developed by Lionel Blatter during his PhD
- > Express **relational** properties between function calls
- > Use **self-composition** to prove the property

Non-interference

```

1  extern int private, public;
2
3  //@ assigns public,private \from public,private;
4  void f() {
5      if (public < 1000) public++;
6      if (private > public) private-=public;
7  }
8
9  /*@ relational
10     \callset(\call(f,c1), \call(f,c2)) ==>
11     \at(public,Pre_c1) == \at(public,Pre_c2)
12     ==>
13     \at(public,Post_c1) == \at(public,Post_c2);
14 */

```

```
frama-c -rpp rpp_test.c -then -wp
```


Instrumented code

```

1 void relational_wrapper_2(void)
2 {
3     if (public_c1_2 < 1000) public_c1_2 ++;
4     if (private_c1_2 > public_c1_2) private_c1_2 -= public_c1_2;
5     ;
6     if (public_c2_2 < 1000) public_c2_2 ++;
7     if (private_c2_2 > public_c2_2) private_c2_2 -= public_c2_2;
8     ;
9     /*@ check Rpp:
10         \at(public_c1_2,Pre) == \at(public_c2_2,Pre) ==>
11         \at(public_c1_2,Here) == \at(public_c2_2,Here);
12     */
13     return;
14 }
```

- Transformation becomes very complex in presence of pointers (and aliasing)
- More flexible solution using directly Wp primitives ²
- Proved in Coq (on a subset of C)
- But not implemented in the Rpp plug-in itself

²Blatter et al., *An Efficient VCGen-Based Modular Verification of Relational Properties*. ISoLA'22, LNCS 13701



- > Initial version by Nicolas Stouls (Inria/INSA Lyon).
- > Automaton encoding admissible call sequences during an execution of the program
- > Instrumented with ghost code, and possibly ACSL contracts

```

1  logged_out: { login() {{ \result == -1 }} } -> attempt_1
2              | { login() {{ \result == 0 }} } -> logged_ro
3              | { login() {{ \result == 1 }} } -> logged_wo
4              | { login() {{ \result == 2 }} } -> logged_rw;
5
6  attempt_1:  { login() {{ \result == -1 }} } -> attempt_2
7              | { login() {{ \result == 0 }} } -> logged_ro
8              | { login() {{ \result == 1 }} } -> logged_wo
9              | { login() {{ \result == 2 }} } -> logged_rw;
10
11 attempt_2:  { login() {{ \result == -1 }} } -> too_many_attempts
12             | { login() {{ \result == 0 }} } -> logged_ro
13             | { login() {{ \result == 1 }} } -> logged_wo
14             | { login() {{ \result == 2 }} } -> logged_rw;
15  ...

```

```
frama-c -aorai-automata automaton.ya test_aorai.c -then-last -eva
```

Ghost functions advancing automaton

```

1  /*@ ghost void login_post_func(enum permission res) {
2    /@ slevel full; @/
3    ...
4    if (aorai_intermediate_state_7 == 1)
5      if (res == -1) too_many_attempts_tmp = 1; else too_many_attempts_tmp = 0;
6    else too_many_attempts_tmp = 0;
7    if (reject == 1) reject_tmp = 1; else reject_tmp = 0;
8      if (aorai_intermediate_state_1 == 1) {
9        if (res == 1) logged_wo_tmp = 1; else goto __aorai_label_16;
10     }
11     else
12     ...
13 } */

```

- > Aoraï's properties intrinsically a whole-program analysis
- > Eva or E-ACSL are the primary candidates for verification
- > Eva-related options and built-ins:
 - > `Frama_C_show_aorai_state`
 - > `-aorai-instrumentation-history`

- > Various possibilities to tell Frama-C what you want to prove beyond mere function contracts.
- > Experiment on industrial code (Aoraï).
- > Used in production (MetAcsl).
- > Takes full advantage of the modularity of the platform.
- > More info in Chap. 10 of the book.

- > Propose specialized analysis plug-ins for some kinds of properties.
- > Abstraction and reasoning at model level (SecurEval project).
- > New kinds of properties (e.g. CaRet, Typestates).
 - > Sébastien Patte
- > *Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?* Formalize ACSL semantics and the transformations
 - > Louis Gauthier
 - > Sébastien Patte